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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

DUTCH EXPERT ON SDI, EFFECTS ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The Hague INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR in Dutch Aug 85 pp 461-469

[Article by G. van Benthem van den Bergh: 'Strategic Defense Initiative and the Nuclear Arms Debate']

[Text] In one respect the success of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) cannot be denied: it has taken the wind away from the opponents of nuclear arms and practically paralyzed the nuclear arms debate. In the Netherlands, the issue of the cruise missiles is still smoldering, largely for reasons of domestic politics, but we are hearing practically nothing about nuclear strategy as such. I do not feel that this is a favorable development. The current debate on whether or not to participate in SDI and its European alternative--itself of sufficient importance from an economical and technological point of view--threatens to push the more fundamental questions on nuclear arms and nuclear arms strategy to the background. For this reason, I wish in this article to take a look at the possibility and desirability of strategic defense, seen from a perspective of a somewhat more long-range role of nuclear arms in international politics.

The Scowcroft Report

At the beginning of April 1983, the "Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces" was released, headed by Gen Brent Scowcroft. This report aimed to bring about a "bipartisan" consensus on the buildup of American strategic nuclear forces--and the MX. With this Scowcroft Report, which was endorsed by Reagan, the "window of vulnerability"¹ was finally officially closed: "...the existence of several components of our strategic forces permits each to function as a hedge against possible Soviet successes in endangering any of the others....And although the survivability of our ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] is today a matter of concern (especially when that matter is viewed in isolation) it would be far more serious if we did not have a fleet of ballistic missile submarines at sea and a bomber force."² Although the logical conclusion was not drawn from this statement that the MX missile is meaningless, the lasting assurance of the invulnerability of a "second strike" nuclear force remained a premise of the report. This is why the report recommended that a "small, single warhead ICBM (Midgetman) be developed, which could indeed be made invulnerable without too

much difficulty--much more easily than heavy, multiple warhead (MIRVed [Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles]) ICBMs.

The foundation of thought on strategic arms in the Scowcroft Report thus remained the concept, in existence since the end of the 1950s, of a combination of territorial vulnerability and invulnerability of the nuclear arms arsenals of the nuclear rivals. The report scarcely makes mention of strategic defense. It does consider intensive research necessary because the Soviet Union is also working on this. But: "At this time, the Commission believes that no ABM [Anti Ballistic Missile] technologies appear to combine practicality, survivability, low cost and technical effectiveness sufficiently to justify proceeding beyond the stage of technology (in contrast to 'weapons'--Van den Bergh) development."³

No trace can be found in the report of the possibility of a successful strategic defense system for the protection of population centers ("area defense"), nor even of the possibility of successful "point defense," the protection of ICBM installations, command centers (C³), airfields, and whatever else this involves. There is "no real promise" for the former, and the report considers the latter "a difficult feat, if the attacker can use a large number of warheads against each defended target."⁴ The Midgetman offers more security, if one wants to continue to have at one's disposal invulnerable ICBMs. However, SDI has pushed aside the development of the Midgetman: little more is being done on it. (As an aside: Because the Midgetman nullifies the most important argument for "point defense" and no one is saying any more that it will be possible to make "area defense" airtight, it constitutes an alternative and thus a threat to SDI.)

The "New Thinking" of President Reagan

I have devoted so much attention to the Scowcroft Report because in this way the sudden transition from the "old" to the "new" thinking is quite apparent. It was in fact released shortly after Reagan's famous SDI (or Star Wars) speech on 23 March 1983. Through this unexpected and poorly thought-out break with the tried and true foundation of nuclear strategy, proponents of SDI probably tend to portray their opponents as traditionalists or conservatives and themselves as the portents of a "space renaissance": "As with every departure from conventional wisdom, SDI has stirred a flurry of resistance...from those who reject change in the familiar conventional wisdom,"⁵ or "...SDI could be the nucleus of a new space renaissance, the 21st century renaissance."⁶

It is implied--and intentionally so--that with SDI we are entering into a new era that cannot by any means be halted. It is a bit reminiscent of the folders, complete with color illustrations, of suburban villa neighborhoods with their own swimming pools and tennis courts, which the project developer is already selling before he has bought the property and gotten building permits--and also before he has discovered that no water pipes can be laid on the the construction lots.

President Reagan gave his speech on future perspectives of strategic defense--only later named SDI--practically in the absence of prior consultation with the Pentagon, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, Assistant Secretary [of Defense] Richard DeLauer, the most important Pentagon expert in the area of strategic defense, was not informed until the day before, while the two leaders of the official research programs in the area of strategic defense, John Gardner and Richard Cooper, were neither consulted nor informed in advance.⁷ President Reagan was relying entirely on advice from Gen Daniel Graham, whose report "High Frontier"--which contends that a stratified defense system could be built with existing technology--was rejected by the Pentagon in 1982, and from physicist Edward Teller, who considered such a system feasible only using future technology. SDI's implications for political strategy were not at all considered beforehand. Only Reagan's notion that mutual deterrence based on MAD--mutually assured destruction--is supposedly "immoral" played a role. Consequently, Reagan's speech was initially not taken very seriously.

I know this from my own experience. In May 1983, I spent a few weeks in Washington. At that time, the Scowcroft Report was dominating debate to a much greater extent than SDI. Reagan's speech was being dismissed somewhat with a shrug at the Pentagon, the State Department and academic institutions such as Brookings [Institute] or the CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies] at Georgetown University--although some people did take research on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) (as ABM was renamed) seriously.⁸ On the other hand, scientific researchers such as Spurgeon Keeny and George Rathjens considered it scandalous that the President dared to make such a grandiose promise to the American people on such shaky grounds. Only the deputy to George Keyworth, the President's scientific advisor, was enthusiastic--but even he at the time made no claims to the possibility of an airtight shield. It would be nice if we could destroy 60 to 70 percent of enemy missiles, because that could seriously hamper the plans of the aggressor and give us a nuclear superiority--such was his reasoning, which has now become commonplace. Nor did the two reports by the Fletcher and Hoffmann Commissions, appointed by Reagan in 1983, raise grandiose expectations, at any rate not about airtight protection against ballistic missiles.

A Combination Steamroller and Bandwagon

The story of the transformation of an ill-considered speech into SDI, with its domination of all security policy, remains to be written. Former Assistant Secretary of State (under Kennedy and Johnson) George Ball says only the following about it: "Whatever the President's motives, the administration quickly closed ranks. Although the project clearly had many closet opponents there was now a mass conversion reminiscent of that decreed by King Ethelbert in the sixth century."⁹

SDI, one might say, suddenly became a combination steamroller and bandwagon. Whoever did not quickly jump on board might be rolled over. The people who did join in faced a beckoning prospect. The technological momentum for economic renewal and financial benefits for the defense industry probably weighed more heavily in this than strategic considerations. This is why the current debate is also almost exclusively about technological policy and

alliance politics. ("We should not rebuff America prematurely"; in and of itself a respectable thought.) Strategic defense serves primarily as background justification. Moreover, it is pointed out to critics that it is still just a question of research, so that the debate on the significance of arms development is supposedly premature.

SDI was presented by President Reagan as a possible alternative to the threat of nuclear retaliation implicit in present nuclear strategy: let weapons destroy weapons instead of populations. In this way, SDI has raised expectations that through it the world could be rid of nuclear weapons. As a prospect for the future, SDI accommodates the wishes of the anti-nuclear arms movement--or those of former Defense Minister Van Mierlo: "If humankind wants to ever leave the age of security and protection by way of the threat of nuclear destruction--without lifting the taboo on war--it is only possible through technological development in combination with political negotiations."¹⁰ For that reason alone, it is asserted, SDI should be granted the benefit of the doubt.

This combination of technological drawing power and rosy prospects for the future has probably led to the fact that the nuclear arms debate has been paralyzed and that in the existing situation attention is no longer being focused on transplanted alternatives. Debate has been reduced to being for or against SDI. There are apparently no alternatives. In this way, something is disappearing from the picture that ought to be central in it: the way of thinking about nuclear arms, on which both the current nuclear strategy and SDI are based.

Normalization of SDI

It is interesting in this context that besides Reagan himself, practically no one talks about SDI any more as a possible way to escape the nuclear dilemma.¹¹ The goal now is supposedly a better balance between offensive and defensive weapons, for the sake of "enhanced deterrence."¹² Defense Secretary Weinberger has always expected a restoration of American superiority through SDI, but he now appears to no longer hold with this. In fact, SDI is no longer geared towards a strategic revolution--even though rhetoric concerning this has not been entirely eschewed--but rather towards an improvement in the means available to existing American and NATO strategies.¹³ In view of this reversed transformation, would it not be more sensible politically to replace "SDI" with another label?

Whatever the case, SDI has now been put within the scope of existing strategy and will have to be viewed in that light alone. I will not devote attention to the details of the still largely exotic technologies, the development of which SDI is to prepare, precisely for that reason.¹⁴ I will only discuss the question of whether and to what extent SDI can contribute to a "reinforcement" of "deterrence."

Two Ways of Thinking About Nuclear Arms

In an area like nuclear strategy, where the plausibility of arguments is what matters since it is difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate statements

with empirical evidence, a priori conclusions have a great amount of influence. Without challenging the initial assumptions, it is often difficult to come to grips with a logically consistent argument. Certain myths--such as coupling or limited nuclear war--thus gain a long life, certainly when a large majority of the "strategic community" adheres to them--and when they are moreover endorsed by the anti-nuclear arms movement.

In order to gain a good understanding of SDI, it is thus necessary to make a distinction between two ways of thinking about nuclear arms--or perhaps rather the two poles of a continuum. The one pole is supported by the assumption that nuclear arms do not in the final analysis differ from other weapons, so that the relationship between military and political power has remained essentially unchanged and nuclear superiority can still be translated or converted into political gain. The other pole--and this is the one that I consider to be more in keeping with reality--emanates from a nuclear revolution, caused by the increasingly massive destructive and suicidal effect of nuclear weapons, which has qualitatively changed relations between the nuclear superpowers.¹⁵ In their conflict behavior, these powers are now forced into a degree of restraint and prudence that has never before existed in the history of rival great powers. The relationship between military and political power has through this been fundamentally altered, because the threat of nuclear arms--and thus also that of "conventional" weapons everywhere that vital interests of the two rivals are at stake--can no longer be used to achieve positive goals.

As long as mutually assured destruction--as a possible result of any military confrontation--is guaranteed, nuclear superiority no longer has any meaning.¹⁶ The first way of thinking sees things completely differently. There is precise calculation of the "military balance" as the sum of all pluses and minuses in particular weapons systems, still of great importance. Any leading or trailing position is viewed as a sign of power or weakness, without it being necessary to make clear the significance of this.

Thought on nuclear weapons is a continuum since, for example, even General Berkhof, who defends SDI with arguments in which the military balance and the alleged vulnerability of the American ICBMs play an important role, accepts the prevention of a nuclear war as a primary goal. In fact, his starting point is restrained conflict behavior,¹⁷ even though he does see a possibility of a conventional "blitzkrieg" that the Soviet Union could start in Europe.¹⁸ In this latter option he overestimates the propensity of the Soviet Union to take risks in an area where vital interests are at stake and the danger of escalation exists.

The fact that military people in general tend to "conventionalize" nuclear weapons and move in their thinking towards the first pole is understandable enough. This is, after all, their mission and tradition of thought. On the other hand, the military knows what they are dealing with and for that reason is mostly very cautious, often more cautious than politicians. This is probably true for the Soviet Union as well as for the United States. In the Soviet Union, there is no public debate on nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy, so that the statements by the military often appear to be in

conflict with political starting points, insofar as this can be gathered from behavior and statements by party leaders.¹⁹ But this can be said of the United States just as well.

Both superpowers are in their arms development and notions of nuclear strategy still very close to the first pole. But the starting point of their conflict behavior is shared risk and the danger of a nuclear war and the possibility that any direct military confrontation can lead to that. This is why I am not that apprehensive of the possibility that the chance of war would increase drastically through SDI. But every little bit is too much, certainly if there are possibilities for making the world safer through other means.

The Nature of the Nuclear Age

Since the end of the 1950s, both superpowers and their allies have been vulnerable to attacks by the nuclear forces of their opponent, but this is not true of a considerable part of their nuclear forces. Even though nuclear weapons have become more accurate--especially land-based ICBMs, although the NAVSTAR navigation system should now make SLBMs [Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles] nearly as accurate--this does not begin to make nuclear weapons arsenals vulnerable to a disarming first strike (see the Scowcroft Report).

The submarine-based nuclear weapons will probably always remain invulnerable, while it is possible that the transition to the Midgetman will also make land-based missiles invulnerable for the foreseeable future.²⁰ This is also true for bombers (and the new stealth technology might produce a formidable new means of transport, against which there does not yet exist any defense). The diversity and the volume of the nuclear arms arsenal are so large that there is no prospect, even on a long-term basis, of one or both parties acquiring a disarming first strike capability. Considering that such a capability would at present have to include approximately 10,000 to 12,000 nuclear warheads, the chances of a "nuclear winter" resulting are great enough to be taken into serious consideration.²¹ Thus, the vulnerability of the nuclear arms arsenal need not be a problem in the future as well. It is at any rate not a sound argument for SDI.²²

The question that follows is then whether the vulnerability of the territory of the present security communities in East and West can be undone. Because it is this vulnerability that constitutes such a ponderous argument for strategic defense, certainly in the United States. The answer is not difficult: it is impossible to protect the population and the cities against attack with nuclear weapons to such an extent that damage remains below the level of assured destruction.²³ Even if an entirely reliable screen against ballistic missiles were possible--and this is possible at best only in theory, because the system can naturally not be tested in its entirety--an equally expensive defense against cruise missiles and bombers is necessary, which still excludes airplanes equipped with stealth technology. But a defense system such as this would again put a premium on clandestinely transported nuclear weapons, such as suitcase bombs that are detonated radiographically. In short, the fact of assured destruction, of the vulnerability of one's own territory and one's own population cannot be denied. But what is often overlooked is that this is not that bad. Indeed, it is a shared

vulnerability--a perfect balance of offensive and defensive capabilities--that keeps relations between the superpowers peaceful and can continue doing just that.²⁴

This fact has nothing to do with the strategy of MAD, as McNamara paid homage to that short period of time in order to keep the Air Force in check. It is a situation, a given. The rash condemnation of MAD as immoral is thus beside the point: what this involves is not an active threat with retaliation, but rather a possibility determined by the situation. The question can then only be whether a safer situation is possible, in which the chance of a nuclear war is even smaller. If not, then the situation of shared vulnerability and invulnerability is--given the impossibility of wishing nuclear weapons away--preferable in moral respects as well.²⁵

If one wishes to use the term "deterrence" for this situation, then it is shared deterrence, not mutual deterrence--by one party acting on the other. This shared "deterrence" is presently assured to such an extreme extent that it would not have to be "strengthened." The restraint in the conflict behavior of the superpowers is not caused by the nature of the "military balance," but rather through the absolute given that any military confrontation could develop into an uncontrollable nuclear war. The fact that quantitative relations have only limited significance in this has to do with the tension between two requirements: on the one hand, the danger of escalation must be maintained--and with it the fear of a nuclear war--while on the other hand the dangers of a nuclear war must be made as small as possible through unilateral steps and mutual agreements. The latter has in fact happened, although it may be spoiled as a result of SDI. The preservation of the risk of escalation demands a sufficiently convincing deployment of nuclear and conventional weaponry, the nature and extent of which can depend on arms control agreements.

The nuclear age has thus on the one hand cast relations between the superpowers in a more peaceful mould, while on the other hand putting restraints on them and bringing about a largely impotent weapons arsenal. The nuclear arms balance has in many respects rendered the superpowers powerless--while the development of power relationships in the world has in other respects also been detrimental to their position. In this, they tend to attribute every loss of power to the adversary and view it as his gain.

SDI as Escape from the Nuclear Age

It is thus understandable that the superpowers would like to escape from the nuclear age or simply act as if it does not exist. It is also understandable that they hope to realize this escape with the aid of military technology and a strengthening of military power. This determines the attraction of SDI as well. And in this, perceptions are just as important as reality, certainly if it appears that the Soviet Union shares those perceptions. Attaching so much importance to the "military balance" and the concept of "who is ahead and who is behind?" is actually based on a comparison of perceptions.²⁶

Quantitative comparisons have no strategic significance. Only the invulnerability of the nuclear arms arsenals and the assurance of the risks of

escalation count, the sole exception being military power that makes intervention possible in areas where the opposing party has no vital interests.

In the tendency towards prenuclear thinking, we also find the answer to the question of why it is so difficult to stabilize a nuclear arms balance that it in and of itself adequate. This is, incidentally, not the only reason. Even if the rivals were to submit entirely to the reality of the nuclear age, it would still be difficult enough to halt the development of arms. There is, after all, no authority above the great nuclear powers that can compellingly dictate to them that they keep a specific stable weapons arsenal and that can settle their differences. The rivalry between the superpowers is unregulated and because of this defined by mistrust. The rivals see themselves as forced to anticipate possible technological developments by the adversary or to follow them. From this there often emerge new weapons systems, entirely independent of strategic concepts. These systems are adapted to strategy or thought of as justification.²⁷

This is not always the case. Sometimes, on the basis of cost efficiency, a particular weapons system is not developed unilaterally. And this has happened bilaterally one time, according to treaty. This is why the 1971 ABM treaty is of such eminent importance. In this case, the rivals agreed to limit the deployment of antimissile missiles to a minimum, because in strategic terms these were meaningless weapons and a continuation of their development would be very expensive for both parties.²⁸ If the ABM treaty had not been concluded, the rivals probably would have continued to force each other up--with continual reference made to the lead held by the other, just as is now happening with SDI research--and would have gone ahead with the deployment of useless systems.

MIRV technology developed differently, because the Americans thought that they had a considerable lead and thought that they were gaining a preponderance in terms of counterforce strategy. But this did not live up to expectations. MIRV technology in fact gave the Russian land-based ICBMs such a greater capability that the "window of vulnerability" could come into being. A MIRV treaty on the analogy of the ABM treaty could have prevented this defense panic.

The ABM treaty does indeed allow research--it would be difficult to put verifiable restraints on this--and this has been pursued by both sides. "Hedging" is inevitable. As a consequence, it is difficult to object to one important part of the research that falls under SDI. It is a continuation of that which both parties have long been doing. In this respect, the propaganda by the Soviet Union against SDI is hypocritical. Moreover, it is questionable whether the SDI research is in fact of importance for the development of strategic defense. Conventional applications could easily seem to be much more important.

Thus, with SDI the cargo is less important than its flag. The flag raised by President Reagan is the umpteenth attempt to escape from the nuclear age. Two types of escape are combined in this: the original perspective of "eliminating the threat posed by nuclear missiles," which would require the

sharing of knowledge and technology with the Soviet Union (of which nothing has since been heard) and the achievement of a strategic preponderance, whereby one's will can to some extent be imposed on the adversary. The latest nostalgia for prenuclear times has in fact resulted in the course of development of nuclear strategies that led to Carter's countervailing strategy (PD 59), which has not been radically modified by Reagan. Lawrence Freedman has called this "the retreat from assured destruction."²⁹

The present strategic situation is a stalemate. The political impotence of one's own weapons arsenals in direct mutual relations (with nuclear weapons the only thing that can be indicated is that vital interests are at stake and that a direct confrontation is possible--as Carter made clear with respect to the Persian Gulf after Afganistan) is indeed accepted, but not the consequences of this for the behavior of the adversary. Thought about this is still pursued in prenuclear scenarios, based on the assumption that the strategic stalemate would make limited attacks by the adversary possible, such as a conventional attack by the Soviet Union on (part of) Western Europe. The "conventional superiority" of the Soviet Union, now again exacerbated by missiles with non-nuclear loads, is an ever-recurring argument in this. This is based on the silent assumption that "conventional" and "nuclear" levels of force can be differentiated in a military confrontation and that a military conflict can be controlled politically.³⁰ But no one can ever be certain of this. This elementary fact thus renders strategic slogans such as flexible response, limited nuclear options, escalation dominance, countervailing strategy and protracted nuclear war ineffectual. The problem of "extended deterrence" and the necessity of "coupling" are also based on these, in my opinion, incorrect assumptions. This is why I consider the debate, which is so popular in our country as well, on the raising of the atomic threshold or the pushback of the role of nuclear weapons misleading.

The Nature of "Deterrence"

The role of nuclear weapons in fact ought to be central. Deterrence--or better yet: coercion to restrained and cautious conflict behavior--consists of the shared fear of an omnidestructive nuclear war and the similarly shared risk that any direct military confrontation can develop into a suicidal war. The nature of that risk is such that not one single political advantage, not one gain in power can counterbalance it.³¹ For this reason, military confrontations between the superpowers and the security communities under their leadership can arise in the nuclear age only unintentionally, resulting from political crisis situations that have gotten out of hand. It is also for this reason that technological and military attempts to escape are unreal and dangerous. Attention must be focused on politics, on keeping a crisis from getting out of hand. In view of the nature of "deterrence" in the nuclear age, the question "what if deterrence fails?" is in fact misleading. In this case, what one really means is "what if the adversary attacks?" But as long as there is a reasonable risk of escalation--and the terms of this have yet to be discussed--this is a misplaced question.

The danger of a nuclear war cannot be warded off or lessened by a "more favorable" military balance. Given the lasting reality of "assured destruction" (AD), deterrence--in both meanings of the word--is not

"strengthened" by a theoretically better (in terms of an entirely improbable controlled scenario of an exchange of blows) counterforce or countervailing deployment of weapons. Nor does this broaden political options. That was indeed the case in prenuclear times: then, A was still deterred by B and vice versa, and military superiority could move A or B to political concessions--or surrender. Once again: those days are past and cannot be recalled (unless perhaps something is thought up with which nuclear weapons can be deactivated at a distance and kept in that state).

In view of the fact that the new weapons that might result from SDI can only be used within the framework of the present countervailing strategy, then these weapons are also worthy of criticism. Strategically, they will be largely meaningless. The "point defense" of ICBMs will probably be unnecessary if the transition is made to the Midgetman. If command centers (C³I) could be protected, it would be very useful, because it would be stabilizing. However, there is the question of whether such a defense could not be saturated rather easily, as the Scowcroft Report found. This question similarly applies to the protection of airfields and other strategic locations in Western Europe.

But if the invulnerability of either strategic nuclear weapons and command centers or weapon positions necessary for the preservation of the risk of escalation can be assured cost-effectively with SDI technology, then that is very useful, all the more so if this takes place through arms control agreements. Statements for or against SDI technology are thus meaningless. As a strategic initiative, SDI is indeed dangerous: it first fosters the illusion of escape from the nuclear age, and then affirms the existing nuclear strategy, which is insufficiently based on the reality of the nuclear age. It can also be detrimental to arms control negotiations, but that does not need to be the case, as long as the ABM treaty is honored or adjusted in common consultation.

Necessity of the Nuclear Arms Debate

SDI has at any rate reinforced illusions and distorted the debate on nuclear arms. How can nuclear arms be defended to the public if SDI (as a space shield) blows over in a little while--when the technological stimulus has already done its work? It will indeed become increasingly obvious that no drastic change in military and strategic relations with the Soviet Union with the help of SDI technology will be possible. What can the public be told when the immorality of mutually assured destruction has been emphasized in such detail? How can American public opinion be brought to accept that cities and civilians cannot really be protected and that the vulnerability of American territory cannot be undone?

The only alternative to the present policy is in fact a return to the recognition of the reality of the nuclear age and a serious attempt at "qualitative" arms control.³² Only on this basis is there a possibility of a stabilization of arms deployment (based on the two criteria of invulnerability and maintenance of the risk of escalation) and an improvement of crisis management procedures and steps to inspire trust.

There is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age: with nuclear weapons, the clearly inevitable political, economic and ideological rivalries can no longer be pursued "by other means." In the long run, it is even possible that nuclear arms--and military power--will be pushed increasingly into the background, in the same way that is the case in our type of nation, with the role of the army in the preservation of public order. SDI could send developments in the opposite direction. This is why we cannot dispense with the debate on nuclear arms, at least if it is freed of prenuclear assumptions. This has yet to be achieved.

FOOTNOTES

1. The "window of vulnerability" scenario of the Committee on the Present Danger was based on increased precision and the number of nuclear warheads of the Russian ICBMs. The Soviet Union--thus went the reasoning--would in this way be capable of destroying the American land-based ICBMs with one blow, afterwards forcing the the United States into political concessions because the American President would be "self-deterred," not willing to use the remaining nuclear weapons (on submarines and bombers) because this would guarantee the destruction of U.S. cities. This entirely improbable scenario gained a remarkable amount of attention and following, probably because it assumed a supposed weakness, which could seemingly be compensated for with the buildup of military power--in contrast to the political weakness of foreign policy, after Vietnam and Watergate, which found such dramatic expression in the Iranian hostage question. The presupposition of the scenario was at any rate completely faulty: the Soviet Union cannot be certain that such a massive attack, about which no experience has been or could be acquired, would succeed; the "collateral damage" in an attack such as this would be so great that there would be millions of casualties among the American population, so that the the reaction of the American President would be entirely unpredictable. The scenario wrongly used as its starting point the chance that the American President would or would not do something rather than the Soviet Union's evaluation of risk: how certain could the Soviet Union be that the attack would succeed and the American President would not react? For these reasons, the scenario should have been sent to the land of fiction. For the scenario, cf. Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," FOREIGN POLICY, No 25, Winter 1976-1977, pp 195-250. For counterarguments Andrew and Alexander Cockburn, "The Myth of Missile Accuracy," THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 20 November 1980 and the special number of ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 1981, with contributions by Kosta Tsipis and William H. Kincade. Cf. also the conclusion of Tsipis' chapter on ICBMs, written later, in his very informative "Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age" (New York, 1983, p 146): "What these facts really tell us is how poorly we can actually predict the outcome of an attack against the missile silos of a country." It is possible that (too) much could go wrong.
2. "Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," Washington, April 1983, p 7.
3. Ibid., p 12.

4. Ibid., P 9.
5. Interview with Secretary of Defense Weinberger in WIRELESS BULLETIN, USIS, The Hague, 11 June 1985, p 4.
6. Lt Gen James Abrahamson, "SDI and the New Space Renaissance," OFFICIAL TEXT, USIS, The Hague, 22 January 1985, p 5. Abrahamson clarifies later that SDI will in particular be "a symbol of national unity...and one that so stimulates the national economy that it could pay for itself." In view of the universalistic ideas of the true Renaissance, his imagery is thus scarcely adequate.
7. See George W. Ball, "The War for Star Wars," THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 11 April 1985, p 39. Ball's article contains more interesting information on the background story of Reagan's speech.
8. Work was already being done at Brookings and MIT on a very informative and detached collection of articles on all aspects of defense against ballistic missiles; it has in the meantime been published: Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., "Ballistic Missile Defense", Washington, 1984.
9. Ibid., p 39
10. H. A. F. M. O. van Mierlo, "SDI moet dwingend argument zijn voor Europese veiligheid" [SDI Should Be a Compelling Argument for European Security], NRC HANDELSBLAD, 17 June 1985; for more on this see Charles L. Glaser, "Why Even Good Defenses May Be Bad," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Vol 91, No 2, Fall 1984, pp 92-123. His conclusion: "Unfortunately, a world in which both superpowers deployed effective defenses is far less attractive than its proponents suggest: even after making the most optimistic assumptions, defensive situations might not be more secure than assured destruction situations; and the more likely outcomes of deploying BMD would place the United States in a situation far less secure than today's" (p 123). A defensive system is technologically sensitive, and small improvements could be very destabilizing politically, which is not now the case with offensive weapons. The chance of conventional war could increase. The threat of clandestine weapons would become much greater.
11. George Ball (op. cit.) has provided a nice description of the confusion that arose in Washington concerning the interpretation of SDI. This only came to an end with Paul Nitze's now canonized formulation. The new strategy would remain "wholly consistent" with that of deterrence, even if a defensive screen is erected: "Deterrence will continue to provide the basis for the US-SU strategic relationship." Cf. also the official formulation in "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative," January 1985, pp 3-4; see also Ch. 8, "The Politics of Strategic Defense" from Jonathan B. Stein, "From H-Bomb to Star Wars," Lexington and Toronto, 1984.

12. This was recently (June 1985) laid down in a new National Security Decision Directive by President Reagan, which is in fact "classified," but on which a "fact sheet" was made public. It contained a denial that "superiority" is the goal of SDI. G. C. Berkhof calls it a new "balance of inequalities" that would have a stabilizing effect because with it the United States could make use of the strong points of its own technological foundation. This could indeed make the military balance more favorable, but then the question remains of what its actual strategic significance is. See G. C. Berkhof, "Het Amerikaans 'Strategic Defense Initiative' (SDI) en de stabiliteit," INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, Vol 39, No 5, May 1985, p 310.

13. Of these, the American nuclear strategy is the most important, because the NATO strategy of "Flexible Response" is dependent on it. The present declaratory strategy was called countervailing strategy by President Carter in his PD 59. It is at a point on the line at which increasingly greater emphasis is put on being on top of the adversary in (technical) capabilities at all levels of force (escalation domination), in order to be able to deter him all the better. This reasoning did in fact come to an end in the attempt--for some time defended by Weinberger--to have the ability to wage a "protracted nuclear war." Countervailing strategy does not go this far. For a description by one of its architects, see Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY, Vol 5, No 4, Spring 1981.

14. See G. C. Berkhof, "Duel in de Ruimte" [Duel in Space], The Hague, 1985, especially Part II, pp 133-281; Kosta Tsipis, op. cit., Chaps. 8 and 9 and Stephen Weinter, Chap. 3, "Systems and Technology," Carter and Schwartz, op. cit., pp 49-98.

15. See Robert Jervis, "The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy," Ithica and London, 1984: a systematic criticism of countervailing strategy from the perspective of the nuclear revolution (especially Chap. 1, "The Nuclear Revolution," pp 19-47), and the more historical study by Michael Mandelbaum, "The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima," Cambridge, 1983.

16. Its only significance is in talking to each other--and to others--about it. For more, see Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Superiority," COEXISTENCE, Vol 21, 1984, pp 7-21.

17. See G. C. Berkhof, "Leren leven met de Bom" [Learning to Live with the Bomb], INTERMEDIAIR, Vol 20, No 48, 30 November 1984. "This creates a restraint among the leaders of nations with nuclear arms to begin mutual conflicts, which is absolutely unique in history and which without exaggeration can be called revolutionary." Restraint is--this aside--indeed a better term than self-control [in Dutch: zelfberheersing], which I used to translate "self-restraint." I would be in favor of replacing MAD with "Mutually Assured Self-Restraint" as a more realistic description of the strategic relationship between the superpowers.

18. Berkhof, "Duel," pp 120-123.

19. See David Holloway, "The Soviet Union and the Arms Race," New Haven and London, 1983, especially Chap. 3, "Thinking about Nuclear War," pp 29-64.
20. On the invulnerability of submarines, see Richard Garwin, "Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable?" INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Vol 8, No 2, Fall 1983, and Kosta Tsipis, op. cit., Chap. 10, "Antisubmarine Warfare."
21. Although the debate on the exact effects of massive nuclear explosions is far from finished--a good overview can be found in "Strategic Survey 1984-85," IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies], 1985, pp 23-28--the "nuclear winter" effect is certain enough to constitute an additional factor of uncertainty of a suicidal nature for the aggressor. The "nuclear winter" effect is taken seriously in the Soviet Union as well. See A. S. Ginsburg, G. S. Golitsyn and A. A. Vasiliev, "Global Consequences of a nuclear war: a review of recent Soviet studies," SIPRI YEARBOOK 1985, London and Philadelphia, 1985, pp 107-127.
22. Increased vulnerability only gains significance if the possibility of a disarming first strike arises. This is why the Berkhof's arguments against A. J. Meerburg do not hold water very well: "SDI and Stability" (see note 12), p 308, all the less since they use warfighting scenarios as a starting point.
23. Assured destruction as the capability of inflicting on the adversary "unacceptably" heavy damage through a second blow has been defined by McNamara as the destruction of approximately 25 percent of the population and 50 percent of industry. "Nuclear winter" and other long-lasting consequences of a nuclear war now make any exact description of "unacceptable damage" extremely arbitrary. Only a very small number of nuclear weapons can pass through a defensive screen for the damage to be "acceptable." See also Charles L. Glaser, op. cit., pp 94-97, who focuses attention of the fact that strategic defense will lead to a cities again becoming the most important targets (in order to guarantee AD).
24. For a description of the development of military-strategic situations since 1945 in terms of the vulnerability-invulnerability ratio, see G. van Benthem van den Bergh, "De Januskop van Kernwapens" [The Dual Face of Nuclear Weapons], INTERMEDIAIR, Vol 20, No 21, 25 May 1984.
25. See G. van Benthem van den Bergh, "Kerken, ethiek en kernwapens" [Churches, Ethics and Nuclear Weapons], INTERMEDIAIR, Vol 19, No 23, 10 June 1983.
26. On "perception theory" as justification for the buildup of the American arms arsenal and as an example of prenuclear thinking, see Steven Kull, "Nuclear Nonsense," FOREIGN POLICY, No 58, Spring 1985. "The most questionable aspect of perception theory, however, is its proposal that, in order to create false impressions, the United States shall play along with the illusion by building militarily unnecessary weapons according to mistaken parameters" (p 29). In Kull's opinion, it is perhaps a "subtle mandate to obfuscate the reality of American vulnerability. Perhaps the

defense that Americans wish the Pentagon to maintain is less a defense against foreign aggressors than a psychological defense against an awareness that they have not yet assimilated" (p 51). Only if this self-deception is stopped is the so necessary "reconsideration of the role of force in international relations" possible. In this perspective, SDI must thus be seen as the umpteenth eagerly swallowed placebo.

27. On the relative importance of the ideas of strategists--besides in justifying that which already existed--see Lord Zuckerman, "Strategy or Romance?" NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 18 July 1985. See also Herman de Lang, "De Bewapeningswedloop tussen de Verenigde Staten en de Sovjet-Unie 1945-1980" [The Arms Race Between the United States and the Soviet Union], Amsterdam, 1984, for the importance of prenuclear strategic notions in the progress of the arms race.
28. For the history and significance of the ABM treaty, see Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley and David Holloway, "The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment," "A Special Report of the Center for International Security and Arms Control" Stanford University, July 1984.
29. Lawrence Freedman, "The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy," London and Basingstoke, 1981, Section 8, pp 331-396.
30. On this, see Robert Jervis, op. cit., especially Chap. 6, "Conclusions" and Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?" Adelphi Paper No 169, IISS, London, Autumn 1981.
31. Thus writes Berkhof (in "The American SDI and Stability," p 307). "By permitting a quick and surprising strike with conventional (or chemical) missiles, airplanes and armored units, there exists according to current military doctrine (?--Van den Bergh) a good chance of settling the conflict before the deployment of NATO nuclear weapons." A "good chance," what does that mean? Let us say 75 percent. But then there is still a 25 percent chance of a totally destructive war. Will the leaders of the Soviet Union or of the United States ever take such a chance? In addition, defining this sort of chance has a considerable margin of error. Because of this, even a 99 percent chance will not be used readily.
32. Berkhof (ibid., p 310) is entirely correct in saying that arms control negotiations should not be dominated by "abacus procedures," but rather by "a definition of stability endorsed by both parties."

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CSO: 5200/2504

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

DUTCH PAPER CRITICIZES SDI NONNEGOTIABILITY

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 20 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] Summit conferences between leaders of the East and West, so experience seems to teach, offer the best chance of success, if they are prepared quietly. Exchanges behind the scenes and "quiet diplomacy" can then provide starting points, which the leaders can build on in their dialogue.

Starting with this fact of experience, no one needs anymore to have exaggerated expectations about the coming meeting between Reagan and the Russian leader Gorbachev. So far both sides are providing their share in a public relations battle, which as its most important result creates a grimmer atmosphere in the field of disarmament discussions.

There was America's test with an ASAT satellite killer condemned by Moscow. Next came Gorbachev's remarks to TIME and visiting American congressmen that Moscow is ready for "substantial reductions" in its nuclear arsenal, in exchange for Washington scrapping the SDI program (according to Gorbachev, the limit would thereby have to be drawn by tests subject to control, for what happens in laboratories escapes observation). And then there was the fact that Gorbachev emphasized having published that he himself had consulted with the Russian delegations on the eve of the resumption of the weapons discussion in Geneva.

Reagan has now also become involved in this game of move and countermove with his statement that research in space weapons, the SDI, will not be brought up in the negotiations. This "system which kills weapons and not men" is too valuable, according to the president, to exchange for missiles, of which there are still too many. His message had an extra impact because it coincided with the Geneva discussion, which had just been resumed.

By virtue of the agreements between Shultz and Gromyko in January, the results of these disarmament negotiations in group I

and II (respectively about long and medium range missiles) are not to be viewed separately from the results in the third group: space weapons. And against that background rises the question what the delegation leaders Karpov and Kampelman will have to tell each other in the coming days.

But of much further ranging significance is the question what Reagan's statements are going to mean for the coming summit. The fact that the chances of success are not increased by them is an understatement. But, nevertheless, it still seems too early for genuine pessimism. The American president hopes at this first meeting with a Soviet leader in his presidential career to lay the groundwork for a sort of code of behavior about how the superpowers must conduct themselves with each other. And the Soviet Union has on its side, with all the criticism, not let any sign of doubt appear about the continuance of the summit.

However for America's European partners, who still face the choice whether and how far they will decide to participate in Reagan's SDI, one question is gradually intruding more urgently. Will the SDI program finally not deprive the disarmament conversations completely of their meaning? And, at the same time, does not continuing in this direction threaten to block the way to constructive discussion about reduction of the nuclear arsenal in Europe? For considerable questions may already be open about the constructive attitude of the Soviet Union in Geneva (how substantial will a "substantial reduction" prove to be?). Reagan was clear enough about America's willingness to sacrifice the negotiations to Star Wars, if necessary.

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CSO: 5200/2506

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH-SOVIET EXCHANGES ON DEPLOYMENT ISSUES VIEWED

PM051352 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 31 Oct 85 pp 1, 7

[Unnamed own correspondent report: 'Moscow Invites Lubbers for Talks on Cruise Missile Decision']

[Text] The Hague--Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov has offered at the present late stage to hold talks about the Netherlands' 1 June decision. The offer is contained in a telegram which Prime Minister Lubbers received from Soviet Ambassador Blatov Wednesday evening [30 October]. Yesterday evening it was completely unclear what the cabinet will do with this completely unexpected offer from the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow it must be decided in cabinet whether the Netherlands will agree to the deployment at Woensdrecht of 48 cruise missiles, because there are more than 378 SS-20 missiles operationally deployed in the Soviet Union (441 according to the latest NATO figures). The figure of 378 is the number that had been deployed on 1 June last year, when it was determined that the Netherlands would deploy if more SS-20's were to appear.

However, Lubbers has always maintained that any Russian signal prior to 1 November could be of importance. "I have hoped and prayed for one," the prime minister said Saturday at a demonstration to mark the end of the people's petition against cruise missiles. According to sources close to the cabinet Lubbers cannot therefore simply allow himself to ignore the latest Soviet offer.

A month ago Lubbers pointed out that, after 1 November, the matter will not be closed by the Netherlands Government. Until the final approval of the deployment agreement with the United States, which will take place next spring, a deployment decision could still be reversed if the Russians come some way toward meeting the Dutch, the prime minister said.

The fact that the Russian telegram interferes with the scenario that the cabinet had in mind (a decision on 1 November) is apparent from the absolute silence government spokesmen were observing last night. Even the existence of the message from Moscow was not confirmed. And the Russian Embassy also refrained from all comment.

The existence of the telegram was revealed yesterday morning by Hans van Mierlo, the man intended to head the list of Democrats '66 candidates in the next election, after the presentation of his draft election program. Van Mierlo made a connection with the recent visits to Moscow by Amsterdam businessman Van Eeghen, who has commuted between The Hague and Moscow before as a private apostle of peace. Van Mierlo said that he himself had been "obliquely involved" in this more recent mission.

If the signals from the Soviet Union do mean some real proposals, Van Mierlo takes the view that the government is duty bound to look into them, even if cruise missile deployment is confirmed by the cabinet on 1 November. According to informed sources, in the last few years Van Mierlo, as former defense minister and an expert in the field of peace and security, has been consulted regularly by Lubbers.

In the NOS Panoramiek television program Van Eeghen was asked last night what his involvement has been in the latest Soviet offer.

He has recently returned from Moscow, where he spoke with politicians and military men, including Georgiy Arbatov, an important adviser to Soviet leader Gorbachev. According to Van Eeghen the Russians are prepared to go further with the reduction of the number of SS-20's than the reduction announced by Gorbachev in Paris earlier this month.

However, according to sources in The Hague the latest telegram contains no hint that the Soviet Union is prepared to make further reductions. It is simply said to be an indication of the "political intention" on the part of the Russians to begin a dialogue. In the earlier, as yet unpublished, correspondence between Lubbers and Gorbachev there is said to have been no hint of such an intention. In a reaction to Van Eeghen's revelations Inter-Church Peace Council Secretary Faber and Labor Party leader Den Uyl again pressed for a postponement of the deployment decision.

Statements in VRIJE VOLK by V. Lomeyko, spokesman for Russian Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, yesterday gave rise in The Hague to speculation that a new Russian offer nevertheless does exist. Lomeyko was in the Netherlands in connection with the opening of the World Trade Center in Amsterdam.

According to this Russian spokesman Gorbachev's letter to Lubbers contains more information than the Netherlands prime minister has indicated. But the Russian was unwilling to say in what respects the letter contains new elements. He again reiterated that the Soviet Union has reduced the numbers of SS-20's in the European part of the country and that Moscow is prepared to reduce its missile arsenal in its Asian part. But the condition must be fulfilled that the U.S. missiles targeted on the Soviet Union's Asian republics must also be reduced.

Yesterday Lubbers entered into a discussion with Labor Party leader Den Uyl about whether the most recent letter from Gorbachev does include more information. Lubbers had already said that this letter contains "no real new information" and he does not want to make the letter public. Only if

Gorbachev agrees will Lubbers make the letter public. A request to be permitted to do so has already been with the Kremlin for some time and was repeated this morning by Lubbers in his talks with Ambassador Blatov.

According to Den Uyl it might be the case that the correspondence has been placed "under the seal of secrecy." But, he said, up to now I did not realize that Mr Gorbachev has done this. According to Den Uyl it is important for the Second Chamber to know what is in the letter before it is able to debate the deployment of cruise missiles. Today he will attempt to force Lubbers' hand by presenting a motion to the chamber. However, the government parties are less than enthusiastic about this.

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CSO: 5200/2539

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES

Lubbers Opposed Delaying Decision

LD311718 Hilversum International Service in English 1630 GMT 31 Oct 85

[Text] The Dutch cabinet does not intend to postpone its decision on the stationing of American cruise missiles in the Netherlands in order to conduct more negotiations with the Soviet Union. This was made known to the Dutch lower house of parliament today by the prime minister, Ruud Lubbers. The prime minister confirmed that the Soviet Government had invited him to come to Moscow to discuss the issue of medium-range missiles.

However, a precondition of those talks is that the Netherlands Government refrain from taking its final decision on the matter tomorrow as scheduled. A Dutch businessman, (Arns van Ecken), who says he has good contacts in the Kremlin, announced on Wednesday that the Soviets had invited the Dutch prime minister to Moscow for last minute talks about the missiles. Mr Van Ecken, said he thinks the Dutch cabinet decision should be postponed. However, the cabinet is expected to approve the stationing of the 48 American cruise missiles tomorrow. They would not actually be stationed until 1988.

Decision Tied to Nuclear Units

PM011431 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Oct 85 p 3

[Correspondent report: "Cabinet: Still No Decision on Nuclear Units"]

[Text] The Hague, 26 Oct -- The cabinet has still not reached any decision on the reduction of the number of Netherlands nuclear units within NATO to two instead of the present six, Prime Minister Lubbers said yesterday after the weekly cabinet meeting. The question has also been discussed by the group of five ministers most closely involved, but there also no decision has been made, Lubbers said.

As already reported, Foreign Minister Van den Broek and Defense Minister De Ruiter have reached agreement with Prime Minister Lubbers and Christian Democratic Appeal parliamentary group leader De Vries on a reduction to two nuclear units in the event of a decision in favor of the deployment of 48 cruise missiles. The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy considers that the Netherlands should retain four nuclear units and will only agree to a reduction to two if NATO also agrees to such a reduction.

Lubbers said that the cabinet will make no decision about the cruise missiles without, at the same time, tackling the knotty question of the nuclear units. He spoke at his press

conference of a "political package" of measures that would run concurrently. Thus the reduction of nuclear units would coincide with the (possible) deployment of the cruise missiles at the end of 1988, Lubbers said.

If NATO does not agree to the reduction of the Netherlands nuclear units, this does not mean that the Netherlands will reject the deployment of cruise missiles. "We would not go that far with our decision regarding the nuclear units," Lubbers said. He said he was not so afraid of a negative NATO reaction.

The prime minister was unwilling to announce any details of the letter he received Tuesday, 22 October, from Soviet leader Gorbachev. He simply said that the letter is both a response to the Netherlands situation and the Netherlands 1 June decision. It also contains the Russian view of East-West relations in general.

The NATO announcement that the number of SS-20's deployed still totals 441 is not considered very important by Lubbers in the light of the 1 November decision. "That figure would only have relevance if Gorbachev had written that the figure announced by NATO is incorrect. He has not done so, and consequently the question of how many SS-20 missiles are deployed in the Soviet Union is not up for discussion."

Seeks Agreement With U.S.

AU012055 Paris AFP in English 1246 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Speaking after a lengthy cabinet meeting, Mr Lubbers said the government's decision would be the object of an "agreement" with the United States. Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek would be charged with drawing up the agreement in an "exchange of letters" early next week, and the accord would be submitted for parliamentary approval "around December 1," he said.

It was a "special procedure because it is not just a government-to-government agreement but an agreement that can only be implemented after parliamentary approval," he said.

Lubbers Announces Approval

LD012157 Hilversum Domestic Service in Dutch 2003 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] The 1 June decision on cruise missiles has been upheld today by the cabinet. Thus, 48 U.S. cruise missiles are to be deployed in Woensdrecht in 1988. Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers made this known tonight in a press conference in which he discussed the Netherlands cabinet decision regarding the deployment of cruise missiles in our country.

[Begin Lubbers recording] We have drawn the consequence from the 1 June decision. It made no sense to postpone now, by traveling to Moscow, because there really was no genuine invitation, only a request to postpone our decision. Hence, our decisionmaking, with ensuing procedures; namely, recommendations and the Council of State debate of the bill. If an invitation to talk had been addressed to us during that time, then we would have certainly accepted it. [end recording]

The cabinet also decided to push aside four of the six present nuclear weapon tasks. The land forces' two nuclear weapons tasks are retained. And, in order to compensate for the nuclear tasks that have been set aside, the Netherlands Government will make an extra effort in the field of air defense.

Reaction to Decision

AU021712 Paris AFP in English 1704 GMT 2 Nov 85

[By Rene Biagi]

[Excerpt] The Hague, Nov 2 (AFP) -- The Netherlands' decision to allow deployment of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) cruise missiles was among Prime Minister Ruud Lubber's best political moves, observers said here today. The decision followed six years of stalling, hesitations from the Christian Democratic Party, hostility from the Socialist Party and a strong anti-nuclear campaign by the Dutch peace movement, one of Europe's strongest.

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CSO: 5200/2538

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

NETHERLANDS PAPER REJECTS OPPOSITION CASE AGAINST MISSILES

PM011101 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 24 Oct 85 p 7

[Editorial: 'No Missiles With a Question Mark']

[Text] In June last year the majority in the Second Chamber declared its agreement with a cabinet decision on the possible deployment of 48 cruise missiles at the Woensdrecht base. That happened after the laborious national cruise missile debate had reached one of its high points after a mere 5 years. At the time it was already to be anticipated that the pro-government majority in the Chamber would only be dissuaded from its commitment to this decision by new facts before (and after) the 1 November 1985 target date specified by the 1 June decision. This target date has almost been reached, the Soviet Union has not accepted the conditions of The Hague's decision, and there is still no U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement in sight, let alone an agreement which would make the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands unnecessary. As a result the government majority in the Chamber now feels committed along with the cabinet to the actual implementation of the 1 June decision.

Against this background it is not surprising that this week's Chamber debate on the control aspects of the cruise missiles to be deployed in the Netherlands and the main outlines of an agreement with the United States about this gave rise to only very little political tension. The left-wing opposition knows that its political future is at stake. It wanted to try to interest the government parties that are on the brink of a decision in a constitutional question. That is, in the thesis that a deployment agreement with the United States could in fact, because of the loss of sovereignty that goes against the constitution, only be approved by a (nonexistent) two-thirds majority in the Chamber.

NATO consultation procedures--whether or not these are referred to specifically in an agreement with the United States--offer the Netherlands too little actual influence on the possible launch of the Woensdrecht cruise missiles--that was the crux of the hypothesis.

The majority of the legislators in the Binnenhof who make the decisions in this country take a different view like the Council of State--that is, that their simple majority is sufficient for the approval of the intended cruise

missiles agreement. We agree with them. The issue deals with NATO weapons which have to serve deterrence and which have to illustrate the link between the United States and its European partners and whose launch must be decided on within the context of the alliance. This is why there are mutually agreed procedures whose aim is efficiency, but these--on the assumption of good faith by those party to the agreement--also prevent a country itself or its territory from becoming involved against its express wish, for example, in the launching of nuclear arms.

Anyone who accommodates his security interests--in part to guarantee his national sovereignty--in an international organization of sovereign states must make or has already made certain choices. That is to say: cruise missiles or no cruise missiles, but at any rate no cruise missiles that are given a separate sign (a question mark?) on Soviet defense staff maps. That is also to say: Those who consider unacceptable the assumed good faith in the adherence to procedures will find no solution in improved rules, but must give consideration to something else, finally perhaps even withdrawal from NATO.

Within sight of the approaching Second Chamber elections the government majority was this week actually asked to reject its political commitment to the approaching implementation of the 1 June decision by accepting the constitutional worries of the opposition. Something like this: Dear voter, we had almost taken a positive deployment decision, but thanks to the opposition we realized in the nick of time that for constitutional reasons our majority was not big enough for this. For this contribution from political fairy-tale land the government coalition would have had to develop sufficient criticism of NATO procedures relating to the possible use of (nuclear) weapons in order to support the opposition's thesis. In addition the cabinet and the government parliamentary parties were implicitly being asked to admit retrospectively that they had not paid sufficient attention to this aspect of the matter.

Now, all that was asking too much. And it was certainly asking too much in a debate that appeared solid but which had a fairly opportunistic odor. Because the champions of greater Netherlands influence (or even of a right of veto) on the use of NATO nuclear weapons made no secret of the fact that they would always say "no" to cruise missiles, and certainly to their use, as Minister De Ruiter said after a series of opposition interruptions. That may well be, but it does not necessarily make the arguments stronger. Besides, duplicity also appeared in the indignant reactions on the part of the left when it was announced by the government that the proposed legislation for the approval of an agreement with the United States will be submitted to the Chamber not on 1 January, but probably already around 1 December. Usually ministers receive praise for legislative speed which allows the Chamber enough time for discussion, but not so this time.

In the last few days what took place was not a discussion by a self-appointed international legal tribunal, but a highly political debate by elected representatives of the people, who as legislators are as important as interpreters of the constitution as they are as controllers of government policy.

And that is all to the good, whether the discussion deals with cruise missiles or not. And the fact that the country's largest opposition party sees itself falling into increasing confusion as events take their unavoidable course is not a constitutional problem but a serious political problem that has for many years been helping it toward its present dimensions and situation.

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CSO: 5200/2539

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH PREMIER'S ADDRESS TO ANTINUCLEAR PROTESTORS

PM011234 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Oct 85 p 8

["Text" of Netherlands Prime Minister Lubbers 26 October The Hague speech to "People's Petition Against Cruise Missiles" meeting: "The Responsibility of Setting an Example in Decisionmaking"]

[Text] Here follows the text of the speech delivered by Prime Minister Lubbers in the Houtrust Hall in The Hague on Saturday.

First, my congratulations on 3.75 million signatures. Some of those around me were amazed when 2 months ago I agreed without hesitation or reticence to the invitation to come here to the Houtrust Hall today on the occasion of this demonstration--the end and the announcement of the results of the People's Petition. I do not hesitate for a moment, because I am convinced of the democratic value of your efforts. I know that in our country there are differences of opinion about ascertaining the number of SS-20's in the Soviet Union, but I also know that you are using the possibility offered by law and society to lend force to your views in a peaceful manner. Today--the outcome has already been announced--we know that many, very many people have gone to the trouble of signing. You, the organizers and those who have applied the effort to make this action a success, have met here today.

Even though a difference of opinion exists, I respect your efforts and the result of the People's Petition, to which many people, both young and old, have wanted to contribute. It does indeed represent a call to politicians in a society which is free and in which we take each other seriously. There are people who have voiced criticism of your action. I have refrained from doing so, not because criticism is not possible, but because from the very beginning I have viewed your action as a demonstration of a mass nature. A demonstration by citizens who wish to make their voices heard together in their concern over nuclear weapons and their protest against nuclear arms.

This mass demonstration is an extension of the gigantic peace march held in The Hague in the fall of 1983. Then I was sitting in "the turret" [reference unknown] and I watched literally hundreds of thousands of people go past. And that was not the first peace march and demonstration. In Amsterdam too in the fall of 1981 there were hundreds of thousands of

demonstrators. Peace with weapons, even nuclear weapons, is a bitter peace; a peace which calls for resistance and reflection, prayer and resistance. The last world war taught us that neutralist pacifism, an appeal simply to international law cannot protect us from aggression, occupation, persecution, and terror. And in more recent postwar history several peoples can talk about similar sad days. For this reason we chose and choose an alliance of free, like-minded states that has for decades already guaranteed peace and security in our part of the world.

But these 40 years have also brought us nuclear armaments and missiles, ever further improved with the aim of deterrence. In the meantime the differences between countries, and in particular between East and West, have not disappeared. As a result it has only been possible to preserve peace through threatening weapons, a bitter peace, and there is always the question: Up to what point is it a question of peace, and where does the madness of overarmament begin?

That is why we have a costly duty to pursue arms control, arms control across borders, the reduction of weapons, and the forcing back of the role of nuclear arms. However, if such a policy is to succeed, then both the great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, must give their cooperation. That is the crux of the matter: both great powers, because the issue is not fewer nuclear weapons in the Netherlands but fewer nuclear weapons in the world.

I do not say that nothing has been achieved on the point of arms control; that is not true. But what is true is that it is already more than 10 years since reasonable success was achieved, and the agreements reached in the past left the way clear to the deployment of SS-20 missiles in unlimited numbers.

When I was speaking of the great peace demonstration in Amsterdam my thoughts went to Moscow, December 1981. At that time I was chairman of the party parliamentary group and together with colleagues I visited a number of capitals to discuss the question of long-range weapons. We went to Moscow too. We made it clear that the Netherlands was the only Western deployment nation that had chosen to first give negotiations a chance, to negotiate first and only then to decide whether or not to deploy. As a present for Gromyko, who received us for a conversation, we had taken with us a photograph album of the 1981 demonstration in Amsterdam--a splendid album.

When looking at the photographs Gromyko clearly took pleasure in the placards with anti-American slogans, but rapidly turned over the pages with some irritation past photographs which called on the Soviet Union to show restraint.

A good beginning to a candid conversation, we thought. But the talks did not go well. Although we pointed to the necessity of limitations, he simply repeated that the fault lay only with the West. And this was a real low point and marked the transition from rational argument to threats. Tragic really, for a country which says that it only wants to protect itself

against the bitter experiences of World War II. A war in which we fought side by side against National Socialism--definitely a war in which we fought side by side.

In the Soviet Union too there were many, very many who fell in World War II. All the more tragic, therefore, were the threats in the direction of the Dutch parliamentarians, who were there for peace and arms control. We felt torn to pieces there. But we had nevertheless to find our way out of the cold war, find our way to peaceful relations. We wanted to smash that image of an evil enemy to smithereens. But simply to give in to pressure and threats: Would that help? Nevertheless, after our experiences in Moscow we decided not to proceed overhastily to deployment. On the contrary, those were the years in which the Netherlands postponed and postponed. Postponed from 1979 until the spring of 1984, more than 4 years in which to give negotiations between East and West a chance--negotiations that fell and rose again.

Sometimes there was a glimmer of possibilities. But these were nipped in the bud. Possibilities... I still remember this time well, particularly the spring of 1983 when the Netherlands put forward concrete ideas and new suggestions for the negotiating process. But then too it was to no avail. Then came spring 1984. What to do? Simply say "yes" to our allies who had already been asking us for so many years? Or to say "no," hoping that the Soviet Union would then soften and at the same time leaving our allies in the lurch? It was in this situation that the 1 June decision that so surprised many people was taken. It surprised many and was criticized by many.

And what did we have in mind? The Netherlands makes an appeal to the great Soviet Union. The Netherlands ignores the alliance's formula. The Netherlands goes its own way. No, that was no easy decision. Working for a worthy peace. That was the reason for the vulnerable stance we adopted at that time. An announcement to our allies again to have patience for another 18 months. An appeal to the Soviet Union to cooperate in breaking a trend. Not a real unilateral step, but a signal at least. A signal via a still-deadlocked Geneva to Moscow. To Moscow, where we patiently began to explain our decision. But that was the time of Andropov, who has since died, and Gromyko. And then it was May 1985.

In the Netherlands we were celebrating 40 years since liberation. Our thoughts went back to World War II. A war in which many Russians and many Dutchmen and so many others lost their lives in the fight against Hitler and his henchmen. Did this not offer some point of contact?

Was it not time, 40 years after World War II, to turn directly to the energetic new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in the name of all the fallen in World War II. On the basis of this I wrote to him. Was 378 not enough? With 1,134 warheads? That is more than twice the number to be deployed in the West European countries. Was it not possible to stop and so prevent the deployment of another 48 in the Netherlands?

You know what the outcome was. Paris followed; Gorbachev's statements there are up to now the last word. A partial response, limitations for a part of the Soviet Union, but at the same time a great open end and, consequently, alas still no break in the trend.

Disappointing, but at the same time encouraging. Finally the start of positive movement. Meanwhile another month has passed. How have I not hoped and prayed that the miracle would still happen and that it will still happen. A Soviet Union which will place limitations on itself and a Netherlands that will not deploy. Hoped, and hoped, and worked for the miracle, so that it would still happen and will still happen. Alas things have not progressed that far. And, after 6 months of postponements, you and I are now facing each other. Six months!... Months!... Six years of postponements. Six years of trying and trying.

We have spoken plainly to the Soviet Union. For our allies, and in particular from those who unlike us have already decided for deployment, we have asked--and I say this on the very best of foundations--for supreme understanding. It is true for every individual and every government that responsibility is no easy burden. In other countries there was sometimes the fear that too little reliance could be placed on the statements of our government, on our policy. This makes it clear that the limits of credible behavior must also always be kept in view.

I would not hesitate to follow, if necessary, a road of our own again, if such a possibility arose. No matter how deeply our involvement in this immense question that affects us all eats into us, we knew from the very beginning that at some time the Netherlands would have to reach a decision on whether or not to allow deployment. It is the responsibility of the government to take the lead in this decisionmaking process. That is what happened on 1 June last year, under the scrutiny of parliament. But on 1 November the balance sheet will have to be drawn up. And even if this brings us to a decision in favor of deployment, I say to you: This effort, your effort, my effort has not been for nothing. Where there is hope there is life. After 1 November, too, if necessary. But there is more. More than in the past, it now looks as if real negotiations between East and West are on the way. That is why we must continue to invest in a worthy peace. In a peace that is less bitter.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH PAPER VIEWS DEPLOYMENT DEBATE

PM031750 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Oct 85 p 9

[Editorial: 'Impressive']

[Text] No matter what one might think of the designs and objectives of the People's Petition against the deployment of cruise missiles, the fact remains that the 3.75 million signature total achieved is most impressive. The fact that support for the petition comes primarily from the large minority whose existence is already known from past mass demonstrations and whose parliamentary representatives are largely to be found on the left does not detract from this. The outcome of the petition organized by the No to Cruise Missiles Committee (KKN) once again makes it alarmingly clear to what extent social and political polarization on the issue of nuclear arms has divided the Netherlands population in the last few years.

Criticism of the approach of the petition against cruise missiles is certainly possible. Of the total rejection of nuclear arms it contains, for example, while the largest political party which took part in the KKN, the Labor Party, certainly does not renounce nuclear arms in its new election program.

Or of the fact that an unknown number of (very) young people have signed the petition. But anyone who leaves it at these and other similar criticisms and simply voices the call that we return to the order of the day is making a dangerous mistake. For such a person would be failing to appreciate the necessity of broad support--that is, consensus on major issues--for the policy to be pursued, in the field of security too. Government, parliamentarians, and serious political parties will have to work for the restoration of such consensus, for example, by not compromising but by explaining and clarifying their policy.

As far as this is concerned KKN Chairman Mrs Strikwerda and Prime Minister Lubbers deserved compliments last weekend, something that cannot be said of Inter-Church Peace Council Secretary M.J. Faber. Mrs Strikwerda left no doubt that even if next Friday the cabinet decided in favor of deployment the KKN will remain within the framework of democratic order and will not call for civil disobedience on moral grounds, although this was only because something like that cannot be proclaimed collectively. The prime minister

deserves praise for his depolarizing behavior at the symbolic handing-over of the petition in The Hague's Houtrust Hall where during the emotional end to the action those present made it impossible for him to speak and by turning their backs on him they showed less than democratic feelings. In this context Mr Faber was really speaking over his shoulder when on Saturday he told the prime minister and the petition activists: "What is at stake next Friday is which wins, nuclear arms or democracy; that is what the ministers have to decide."

The prime minister rightly pointed out in his speech, which he later repeated to the Christian Democratic Appeal party meeting, to the fact that on the question of NATO nuclear arms modernization the Netherlands has observed extreme restraint and that there can be no suggestion of "a surprise attack" by the cabinet. In many Western capitals this statement will indeed sound like an understatement. Perhaps it is even the case that since the NATO two-track decision in 1979 the Netherlands has invested so much in political restraint that political clarity has already lost out as a result. There must be some connection between this lack of clarity and today's polarized attitudes. A connection which does not grace "political life" in this country.

If the Netherlands' own (delayed) two-track decision of 1 June 1984 must be carried out at the end of this week in such a way that a decision in favor of the deployment of 48 cruise missiles at Woensdrecht (in 1988) is reached, the cabinet also intends to propose to our NATO partners more or less in the way of barter a substantial reduction in the existing Dutch nuclear units. The fact that the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy politicians in the cabinet and parliament make their final agreement to such a reduction from six to two units (also in 1988) dependent on a probably critical "yes" from our NATO partners must also serve some purpose for the Christian Democratic Appeal too, which is seeking some politically visible compensation for its agreement to the imminent cruise missile decision. This promises to be a sort of interim wind-down of the Dutch nuclear arms debate. It is a great pity that this wind-down seems to be progressing so unsoberly. For this diverts attention from the fact that this is not really a national game with nuclear units (2, 3 or 4, which will win?) but an important question about how NATO is to reduce its too large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. And that is more important than a palliative bandaid for The Hague's wounds, no matter how welcome this in itself would be there.

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NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

THAI PAPER BACKS NUCLEAR-FREE SOUTHEAST ASIA

Bangkok NAEO NA in Thai 4 Aug 85 p 4

[Editorial: 'Day of Peace']

[Text] A day of great meaning for the world is 6 August. Because on this day 40 years ago, tens of thousands of people lost their lives when the first atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, Japan.

On this day, people throughout the world will hold large demonstrations against nuclear weapons. There will be large demonstrations in the United States, Europe and Japan. In Japan, where the emperor presides at a commemorative ceremony each year, there will be a very large demonstration.

The anti-nuclear weapons movement, which is expanding throughout the world, has come about because peaceloving people realize that the terrible arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is leading the world to the brink of disaster. Each side has enough nuclear warheads to destroy the world in the blink of an eye. And there is no place on earth that can escape this danger.

In Thailand, an anti-nuclear weapons movement was launched for the first time this year. The committee in charge of the 1985 Year-Of-Peace Program and 35 private organizations have organized a Week of Religion and Peace at Thammasathan, Chulalongkorn University, in order to stimulate the Thai people to think about the problem of world peace.

The Peace Committee will exert pressure on the government to make this a nuclear free zone. It is thought that if the Thai government initiates this, the other members of ASEAN will take similar steps. As for other activities, at 0600 hours on 4 August, there will be fasting in memory of the hardships and suffering experienced by people as a result of war. Those participating in the fast will walk from Victory Monument to Thammasathan, Chulalongkorn University.

This peace movement should be supported. The demand that this region be a nuclear free zone is in line with the previous idea of turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and neutrality. However, the ASEAN governments have now changed their policy and are asking the United States to maintain its military

bases in the Philippines. This has turned the words "zone of peace and neutrality" into a meaningless phrase on a piece of paper.

Thailand is like the other poor, undeveloped countries in the world that are trying to improve the lives of the people and give them hope. There is nothing to be gained from engaging in an arms race and waging nuclear war. Thus, the peace movement should not be limited just to the activities of the people. Surely, the government, too, wants peace and wants to avoid a nuclear war that would destroy our country and the world.

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NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

THAI COLUMNIST HAILS SOUTH PACIFIC ANTI-NUCLEAR PACT

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 9 Aug 85 p 2

[Small World column by Kanching: 'Peace']

[Text] It is good to hear that eight countries in the South Pacific, including New Zealand and Australia, have signed a treaty to prohibit the testing, possession and use of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. Reports have stated that Mr Lange, the prime minister of New Zealand and the spearhead in banning U.S. nuclear warships from entering the country, which has created problems for the ANZUS Treaty, signed this treaty immediately. Mr Lange has fought for this. It is good to know that a country like New Zealand has a leader who refuses to side with the great power on all issues as do other countries.

The 16th annual meeting of the South Pacific nations was their most important meeting ever. The decisions made at that meeting will affect the future of this region. That is what Mr Lange said, and it is the truth. There will be peace in this region if these terrible weapons can be kept out of the region. As Mr Lange said, if New Zealand allows nuclear weapons to be deployed in New Zealand, New Zealand will become a target for the enemy's nuclear weapons.

The signing of this treaty is a real step toward peace. It should serve as an example for other regions. The countries that signed this treaty include Australia, New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Miua, Tuvalu and Western Samoa. The representatives of another five countries who participated in the conference have taken the treaty, which is called the "Rarotonga Treaty," back to their countries for approval before signing. It is believed that these countries will definitely participate in this movement.

Everyone knows what the result will be if nuclear weapons are used. And this is also the anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The pictures of the terrible suffering should serve as a reminder to those concerned. The effects were not like those of ordinary bombs that caused immediate destruction. The terrible effects of the atomic bomb continue to eat at the bodies of those who were within a certain radius. And physical deformities were not the only effect. People have suffered terrible psychological effects as a result of the disaster that befell them.

At a ceremony commemorating the 40th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, President Reagan said that atomic energy should be used for peace, not for war. "Atomic energy can put an end to war," said the leader of the United States, the first country to use this weapon. But I am not sure that atomic energy can stop the insanity of people.

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GENERAL

SOVIET JOURNAL ON HISTORY OF U.S. NEUTRON BOMB PROGRAM

Moscow NOVYY MIR in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 198-214

[Article by B. Belous: 'Death Rays']

1

[Text] In one of his numerous statements U.S. President R. Reagan characterized the neutron bomb with unconcealed delight as "a death ray weapon from science fiction." This was an admission of love at first sight.

British Professor (E. Burop), former president of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, recalled that he first heard about this weapon back in 1944, when he worked together with a group of English scientists in the USA on the Manhattan Project. As we know, the main objective of the work carried out within the framework of this project was to create an atomic bomb utilizing energy released by fission of uranium and plutonium nuclei. The first atomic bomb had not yet been created, and mankind was still oblivious to that sinister atomic mushroom, but American scientists were already considering ways to impart even greater killing power to their atomic club.

But the birth of "death rays" was postponed for many years. In the same way that it was impossible to create a hydrogen bomb before creating an atomic primer for it first, the neutron bomb could come into being only on the basis of thermonuclear weapons.

In the first postwar years military specialists of the USA existed in a state of euphoria brought about by possession of the atomic bomb. On 1 November 1952 the Americans tested their first thermonuclear device, "Mike", with a yield of 5-8 million tons of TNT, on the island of (Elugelab) (Marshall Islands). This was followed by a period in which stockpiles of nuclear weapons with yields of millions and tens of millions tons of TNT were created. According to authoritative testimony from a prominent American physicist, (R. Lepp), who worked as an adviser to the Pentagon and who participated in nuclear weapon tests, by that time American military specialists had already received a thermonuclear charge with a yield of 100 megatons. For comparison recall that throughout the entire history of World War II the warring sides expended ammunition with a total yield of about 5 million tons.

After this, the idea of creating a 1,000 megaton bomb or, as it came to be called, a gigabomb, began to be suggested in the USA. According to estimates

by specialists such a bomb should weigh about 100-200 tons. The sole means of transporting it to a target would be a ship. Secretly delivered by sea to the shores of some state, this bomb, in the opinion of Washington strategists, could serve as a powerful means of political blackmail in the hands of the aggressor. Following development of rocket technology it could be launched into space, where it would hang above the head of a given nation as a real Damoclean sword.

Almost simultaneously the USA conducted an intensive effort to create a radiological weapon which would do its destruction by the radioactive substances formed by the explosion. A shell of various materials was created around the thermonuclear charge of such a bomb. In response to the action of ejected neutrons these materials transformed into radioactive isotopes with a high intensity of nuclear emission.

The cobalt bomb project became the best known. Relatively inexpensive cobalt was added to the shell of the thermonuclear bomb, as a result of which an explosion would create the highly radioactive isotope cobalt-60. Albert Einstein, who was tormented until the end of his life by the thought of his involuntary participation in creation of the atomic bomb, declared the following about the new bomb with his typical frankness: "Were it to be created, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere and consequently annihilation of all life on earth would come within the limits of technical possibility."

Proponents of the doctrine of the Italian General G. Douhet, who claimed a decisive role for aviation in modern warfare, resurrected his ideas at a new atomic level. They asserted that to achieve victory over the Soviet Union, more "Flying Fortresses" carrying nuclear weapons would be the only thing needed. Citing the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, these "theorists" argued that Japan's surrender was supposedly brought about by strategic aviation. American strategists were fascinated by the harmony of an atomic explosion, which they described by a simple formula of annihilation: one airplane--one bomb--one city. Later on, in the period of domination of the strategy of "mass retaliation," this boastful motto was transformed by them into an even more attractive formula of nuclear war: one hit--one victory! This made a strong impression upon congressmen, and therefore in the first postwar years the struggle between the air force, army and navy to obtain billion-dollar allocations for nuclear rearmament invariably ended in favor of aviation.

However, by as early as the 1950s the military strategic conceptions of the United States collided with a large number of unexpected complications that compelled the "copperheads" of the Pentagon to turn their attention to other possible ways of improving nuclear weapons. The war in Korea played a special role in this sense.

As we know, in 1950 the United States undertook armed aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea together with its obedient satellite, South Korea. More than a million persons, up to a thousand tanks, over 1,600 airplanes and more than 200 ships took part simultaneously in the combat activities on the aggressor's side. But the hopes for an easy victory were unjustified, and the USA found itself drawn into a protracted bloody war.

When the danger of being pushed into the sea became a reality for the aggressor's troops, the headlines of the most reactionary American newspapers bristled with appeals: "Drop it!" (That is, the atomic bomb). Such demands were sounded on several occasions in Congress as well. In the opinion of Pentagon generals a Korean Hiroshima was needed for a victorious conclusion to the war.

However, this threatened escalation to atomic war, which could grow into a third world war. When the American generals were stopped, it was a long time after that before they could make peace with the notion that they had been prevented from putting their nuclear club to use. An official report given by the U.S. secretary of the air force, "The Air War in Korea," sounded like a requiem for forfeited victories. American military specialists argued that final victory could have been achieved by dropping one atomic bomb in the vicinity of (Tkhonchkhon) and six bombs in the vicinity of the Pyongyang-(Chkhorvon)-(Kimkhva) triangle in the night of 25 November 1950.

One of the main conclusions reached by American generals as a result of the Korean adventure was this: Inasmuch as a high-power atomic bomb could be used only in the extreme case, various tactical nuclear weapons for use right on the battlefield had to be created.

Military exercises in West Europe played an important role in forcing the efforts to create such weapons. In 1955 NATO troops conducted a major exercise with the code name "Carte Blanche" involving simulated use of nuclear weapons. In addition to practicing one of the variants of a war with the Soviet Union, the possible number of sacrifices among the civilian public of the FRG in response to using just 268 tactical nuclear weapons to defend its territory was determined at this exercise. It was found that the probable destruction and losses would exceed by 5 times the results of all bombing missions over Germany in World War II. NATO strategists became persuaded that use of even an insignificant number of low-power nuclear charges would be equivalent to suicide to European states.

Therefore scientists at the USA's nuclear centers were given the task of creating a tactical nuclear weapon with a reduced "side effect," of making it "more limited, less powerful and cleaner" than its predecessors.

2

The intensity of research carried out by Washington's chief "think tanks" grew swiftly. The successes in improving nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s showed that the dreams of weapons with lethal emissions were descending from the stars of science fiction to the solid ground of technical progress.

Samuel Cohen, an associate of the RAND Corporation's scientific research center nicknamed "Mr. Neutron," displayed special enthusiasm and persistence in developing a neutron warhead. He worked on a problem concerned with development of tactical nuclear weapons that was extremely important from the Pentagon's point of view--that of revealing the potentials of low-power weapons against

enemy manpower on the battlefield. Thousands of other scientists and engineers of the Pentagon's main nuclear centers--Los Alamos and Livermore--worked simultaneously with Cohen. They competed with each other stubbornly for about 20 years to create a neutron warhead. This time the Livermore Radiation Laboratory emerged victorious in the keen competitive struggle, having developed a nuclear charge producing a high yield of nuclear emissions.

But work on the new weapon did not proceed as smoothly as its proponents might have wished. The first obstacle on this path was the Geneva talks, during which the Soviet Union, the USA and England voluntarily pledged in 1958 to refrain from nuclear testing. This could have slowed down creation of the neutron bomb, and so people began trying to persuade President Eisenhower of the need for tearing up the moratorium. "If you give the Livermore Laboratory just a year and a half," E. Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, prevailed upon the president, "you would receive a clean nuclear warhead." The temptation was so great that in December 1959 the American president announced that the United States "considered itself free of the obligation to refrain from nuclear testing."

Soon after J. Kennedy was elected to the post of chief of state, THE WASHINGTON POST AND TIMES HERALD carried an article presenting some information about the "technical innovation": "The neutron bomb is a weapon intended to kill people. It is called a clean thermonuclear, or clean, bomb. When it bursts, it emits a flow of high-energy neutrons capable of punching through concrete, iron, lead, earth and the human body. Rays from a neutron bomb can cause illness and death among people while leaving inorganic matter undamaged." The widely publicized "cleanliness" of the new weapon could be compared only with the shine of a sharpened executioner's axe that guaranteed its victim decapitation with absolute sterility. The neutron bomb corresponded most fully with the viewpoints of the capitalist elite of the USA on the goals and methods of predatory war. Preservation of material valuables and annihilation of their owners made war waged with such a weapon extremely enticing and promising.

The expansion of the program of research to create "death rays" that followed soon after was explained by Kennedy's desire to tie in development of military technology more closely with political goals. "The more diverse our weapons," the president said, "the more political decisions we will be able to make in a given concrete situation."

But Kennedy could not ignore the power of public opinion, and therefore he demonstrated a certain amount of inconsistency in relation to nuclear weapons. On the day of his inauguration,* 20 January 1961, which tens of millions of Americans watched on television, he declared with emotion and with genuine sincerity: "We do not need victory with the taste of radioactive ashes in our mouth!" Kennedy was concerned, not without grounds, that adoption of nuclear weapons by the armed forces would raise the probability of their accidental use, which could lead to world thermonuclear catastrophe. In the

* A solemn ceremony of assumption of the post of chief of state.

last year of his stay in the White House he spoke with increasingly greater restraint about the need for arming the American army with "death rays."

The first explosion of a neutron charge (W-63 was its code number) in an underground tunnel at a Nevada test site in April 1963 did not cause the light beams of sensitive seismographs in other countries to stir. But this "quiet explosion" was precisely what heralded the birth of a third-generation nuclear weapon--the neutron bomb. Nonetheless to the deep disappointment of its "fathers" the infant was prematurely born. The intensity of neutron emissions was significantly less than calculated, and the "fathers" had to spend many more years nursing their baby before it would stand firmly on its own legs.

The military-political elite of the USA suffered terribly over the loss of their monopoly over nuclear weapons. The hope of evading retaliatory nuclear strikes in a war fell through. Given the situation, the idea of creating a system for defending against the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles came into being. It was decided to create a so-called integrated weapon which would bring together strategic offensive resources and an antimissile defense system. In the minds of the ideologists of such "integration," in the event of a sudden nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union the main military objectives of the USA would be dependably covered against a retaliatory strike by Soviet warheads. To the great joy of businessmen of the military-industrial complex, the USA began developing various antimissile defense systems costing tens of millions of dollars for this purpose.

At first, using high-yield thermonuclear charges (with destructive action based on the shock wave and light emissions) in antimissile warheads was proposed. However, tests showed that the attacking warheads of enemy missiles could be dependably destroyed by a shock wave only at relatively low altitude, where the density of the atmosphere is sufficient for this purpose. But with explosions at such altitudes, destruction of one's own territory occurs.

A decision was made to use nuclear warheads of relatively low power. According to estimates by military specialists, fast neutrons, which possess high penetrating power, are capable of passing through the shell of a nuclear warhead, damaging electronic apparatus and, acting upon the atomic charge, provoking a nuclear fission reaction in uranium or plutonium. In the final analysis, this destroys the charge.

In 1975 several dozen Sprint antimissiles of the Safeguard system covering the air force base at Grand Forks (North Dakota) carried neutron warheads. But the proponents of creating antimissile "umbrellas" were unlucky this time as well. The new warheads would not fully guarantee annihilation of enemy missiles. After this, the apologists of the new weapon decided to literally come down from the sky to the sinful earth.

In December 1975 higher officers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) staff located at Offut Air Force Base (Nebraska) met with prominent representatives of the military-industrial monopolies. The participants of this meeting expressed alarm concerning the negative influence the policy of detente was having upon the military budget and the income of military-industrial concerns.

Considering the provocative, destabilizing nature of neutron weapons, they made a decision to do everything they could to see that weapons of this type would be adopted.

3

Developers working to improve the neutron charge soon achieved a "brilliant confirmation" of their initial idea. On receiving a special report on this account, in April 1976 President Gerald Ford signed a bill providing additional money to the Energy Department. (Following abolition of the Atomic Energy Commission all issues connected with creation, production and testing of nuclear weapons in the USA were transferred to the newly created Energy Department, which immediately began to be called the little Pentagon.) In November 1976 continuing underground tests of a neutron warhead were conducted at a test site in Nevada, 60 km northwest of Las Vegas, not far from a place with the symbolic name Death Valley. The results were so impressive that it was resolved to push a decision through Congress to produce neutron ammunition in the "needed quantity." Confidence in the favorable outcome to this operation was so great that in late 1976, without waiting for Congressional approval, President Ford signed a top secret document creating stockpiles of neutron projectile components for 203.2-mm howitzers and Lance missile warheads.

Succeeding Ford, J. Carter was extremely active in promoting production of the neutron warhead, which he immediately found to his liking. It was namely this "quiet president with a blinding smile" who began intensively preparing the people for mass murder by neutrons. On his instructions a massive campaign to brainwash the public and encourage Congress to allocate billions to the new bomb began. Considering the price of gold at the official basis of the American dollar, it would not be difficult to calculate that instead of one neutron projectile for an 8-inch howitzer weighing 91 kg, three of the same weight could be manufactured out of pure gold. Two neutron warheads for the Lance missile, weighing 210 kg each, cost as much as three gold warheads of equal weight.

The "battle for piasters" began when General (Starberd) of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), a representative of the presidential assistant for national security, appeared before the House Subcommittee for Defense Allocations. He insistently persuaded the Congressmen that the Energy Department must have \$10.2 billion for nuclear weapons. When the issue of producing neutron weapons was submitted to the Senate for examination, proteges of the military-industrial complex joined the effort. In their emotional speeches against Senator M. Hatfield's amendment annulling assets for production of neutron warheads, they expressed total unanimity in what was most important to them: "You can't kill a hen that lays golden eggs." The generously greased American voting machine worked faultlessly, rubber-stamping a decision in the interests of the military-industrial complex.

In his time, U.S. President F. Roosevelt, who was well acquainted with the morals of American political jungles and the behind-the-scenes voting mechanism, frankly admitted: "Give me \$10 million, and I can cause any constitutional amendment to fail." And the situation in this case involved hundreds of

millions which the bosses of the military monopolies were so impatient to receive.

But a complex problem arose here: Weapons intended for Europe were accumulating in the arsenals of the United States for the moment. By whatever means, they had to be rebased there, where they could be put to use "if necessary."

The military and political aspects of neutron weapons were discussed for the first time with representatives of the NATO countries long before the events described here. American leaders began brainwashing their allies during a meeting of the NATO nuclear planning group in June 1974, long before the new tactical weapons were adopted. In fall 1977 in Hamburg, during a meeting of the same group, a representative of the American command gave a report titled "Raising the Effectiveness of NATO Nuclear Forces in the European Theater of Military Operations." The report substantiated the advantages which the armies of Western states would receive from such weapons.

In subsequent meetings held in Brussels and Ottawa, American military specialists returned again and again to this topic, fighting for consent to deploy neutron projectiles for 8-inch guns and neutron warheads for Lance missiles on the territory of West European countries. At a regular meeting of NATO in May 1978 the USA insisted on approval of a program for increasing arms over the next decade. Its implementation will cost these countries an additional \$80 billion.

Not long after, some American newspapers carried reports that the NATO council had approved adoption of neutron warheads, and somewhat later preparation for deploying new tactical weapons on the territory of West European states was reported.

The antinuclear movement arose with new force in West Europe--the principal area for which the neutron weapons were being prepared. As one of the reporters aptly put it, the public expressed no joy in the fact that the homes and wallets of the victims would fall to the assassin whole and unharmed. Even executives of a number of Western European states were compelled to admit under the pressure of public opinion that creation of neutron weapons would invariably bring on dangerous consequences to all of mankind in the political, economic and military areas.

Fearing a breakdown in relations with allies and other capitalist countries in which the protests against the new weapons were especially noisy, Carter never did resolve to implement in their entirety his plans for mass production and deployment of neutron weapons in West Europe. In fall 1977 and in spring of the following year he announced postponement of a final decision. White House officials reported that the president postponed it "in order to study the issue better." American administration officials hoped that time would work in their favor. Passions would gradually die down, and everyone would get used to neutron warheads, as they did earlier to deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. In fact, a little while later, in October 1978, President Carter signed a bill allocating \$3 billion for the "national security program" to the Energy Department for the next fiscal year. A significant amount of this money was intended for manufacture of the components of neutron weapons.

Even before he moved into the White House, Reagan did not conceal his delight in neutron weapons, feeling them to be among the most remarkable military discoveries. Besides the political and military goals that the present American chief of state is pursuing, paving the way for numerous military programs, there is one other reason for special concern over Reagan in this aspect.

Close relations were established between Ronald Reagan and Morgan's General Electric Corporation, which does big business in war preparations, for the first time in 1954, when the president-to-be started appearing in the leading weekly television program "General Electric Theater." The time of Reagan's employment by this company coincided with his participation in the "thermonuclear breakthrough." This is what the American mass media called the grandiose boom in production and accumulation of hydrogen weapons. By this time the company had transformed into a powerful military-industrial corporation. Its participation in nuclear business began with the Manhattan Project. It was back then that the bosses of this military-industrial monopoly felt the truly golden bite of nuclear business. After the guns of World War II fell silent, with the assistance of their proteges in the administration of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Morgan's group seized control of the largest and, at that time, the sole complex producing plutonium, and later on tritium, in Hanford (plutonium and tritium are the most important components of not only nuclear but also neutron weapons). Capturing this beachhead, the corporation waged an offensive against other spheres of atomic industry as well, not without success. In particular it won a contract to build a nuclear warhead plant in Pinellas (Florida). Since that time the corporation has belonged to the elite of the largest producers of American nuclear weapons.

The political viewpoints of the future president manifested themselves especially clearly in his participation in the 1964 election campaign, when he supported one of the most brazen reactionaries of postwar America--Barry Goldwater. This helped Reagan gain the trust of the owners of large industrial monopolies, and with their assistance in 1965 he took the governor's chair in the main military-industrial state in the United States--California.

Persuaded as to Reagan's anticommunism and his unlimited devotion to the masters of America, beginning with the late 1960s the bosses of General Electric began considering him as a future candidate for the country's presidency.

During the 1980 "rat race" (that is the way election campaigns are referred to in the USA), owing to full support from the uncrowned kings of military business Ronald Reagan achieved victory over his competitor and moved to the president's chair in the White House.

Soon after, numerous military programs were laid on the president's desk, to be subsequently materialized in the form of MX intercontinental missiles, B-1 and Stealth strategic bombers, Trident missile submarines and Pershing missiles. But contrary to the expectations of even some highly placed government officials and bosses of the military-industrial complex, Reagan selected neutron warheads for his debut in the arms field. He decided to fill the gap in tactical nuclear weapons, and do what his predecessor had been unable to do. On 6 August 1981, the 36th anniversary of the tragedy at Hiroshima, Reagan announced his decision to begin mass production of neutron weapons to a meeting of the planning group of the National Security Council.

Supplying 2,000 projectiles for 203.2-mm howitzers and 800 warheads for Lance missiles was proposed as the first payment into the "neutron bank" of North Atlantic solidarity; over \$2.5 billion were allocated for this purpose. This was an open challenge to the world public, a demonstration of the fact that the USA would not refrain from using the new weapons "if necessary," as it had done 36 years previously.

In the meantime the Livermore laboratory was continuing its research on creating new neutron charges that could be placed in small-caliber projectiles. Impressive successes were soon attained. In June 1983, under pressure from the administration, Congress approved an additional allocation of \$500 million for the next fiscal year to manufacture W-83 155-mm neutron projectiles. But this was not all. The United States is now working on an artillery projectile with a neutron charge of even lower caliber. According to its creators despite its small dimensions it will produce neutron emissions of much greater power than could its predecessor, the W-83.

Following the United States, other members of the "NATO nuclear club" opted for neutron weapons. Some specialists point out directly that the significant growth in tritium production noted in the early 1980s in England was associated with the aspiration of Thatcher's Conservative cabinet to also become possessors of neutron warheads. Interest in developing neutron weapons was also manifested in subsequent years by the French government. Western military specialists believe that this explains "the possible reexamination of French strategic doctrine and change in France's attitude toward NATO." President F. Mitterrand announced that "technical possibilities for producing neutron weapons must be preserved." The American administration bases its encouragement of France's efforts to create its own weapons on the idea that after the French army adopts neutron warheads, the governments of other NATO countries would initiate deployment of such weapons on their territories.

Interest in this form of weapon is not weakening. According to a report in the journal STERN, General B. Rogers, supreme commander in chief of combined NATO armed forces in Europe, announced in May 1984 that the government of the FRG was prepared to give its consent to deploy such weapons on its territory.

The American press reports that as a supplement to the nuclear charges present in South Korea today--over a thousand, there are plans for sending Lance missiles with neutron warheads and 8- and 6-inch neutron projectiles to that country. Delivery of the first 56 neutron warheads to South Korea was reported in fall 1984.

5

Even before the work of creating neutron weapons was finished, they were deemed a "sacred cow of the Pentagon." Publicity on "death rays" is based on the thesis that the new weapon is "humane." The new resource of mass annihilation of people, animals and the plant world was glorified as a manifestation of "real 20th century humanitarianism." The proponents of the new weapon are trying to persuade the European public as to special advantages in killing

people with radiation. General Groves, formerly the administrative executive of the Manhattan Project, persuaded Congressmen that death from radiation is a completely pleasant death. Thirty years later, S. Cohen, feeling such assertions to be unpersuasive, went even farther. "People in cities," he asserted, "who could not be evacuated may take shelter underground. War would not be something terrible to them, and they could calmly sit it out in cellars in security."

The absurdity of such assertions was so obvious that even the American newspapers laughed at them. For example THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE wrote the following ironic statement: "What neutron bombs annihilate is not property but only life." (G. Skovill), a prominent American scientist, politician and public official, noted that the neutron bomb is in fact humane, but only "in relation to buildings."

In their aspiration to create publicity for their new weapon, its apologists are resorting to direct falsehood. They prefer to remain silent about the fact that the neutron bomb possesses all of the destructive properties of nuclear weapons. As we know, about 20 percent of the energy of a neutron charge is released in the form of a shock wave. One can imagine what would happen if a 200-400 ton charge were exploded 150 meters above a city. One should also consider radioactive contamination of the terrain caused by neutrons near the epicenter of the explosion.

Moreover American military specialists estimated that for every 100 tons of power of an atomic primer, a complex mixture of isotopes possessing a radioactivity of 3,000 tons of radium forms 1 minute after the explosion. Even a day later it retains the activity of a ton of radium. For comparison recall that during World War II there was a stockpile of a few grams of radium in a certain laboratory in London. Whenever an air raid signal sounded, a metal cylinder containing the radium was lowered into an underground shaft, so that people living in nearby blocks would not suffer from radiation in the event of a direct hit by a bomb.

A neutron weapon inflicts its principal damage upon "biological objects" by a flow of fast high-energy neutrons with an average energy of about 14 mega-electron-volts. But explosion of a neutron charge is always accompanied by gamma-radiation as well. It forms as a result of the trapping of neutrons by atoms in the warhead materials and in gases in the air. As we move farther from the explosion epicenter, the proportion of gamma-radiation within the total radiation flow gradually rises. And although this is called a neutron weapon, it possesses combined destructive action--gamma-neutron, and this increases its danger and complicates defense against it.

In the first weeks and months after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese medical workers were bewildered. They could not explain why the radiation injuries of the *hibakusha** residing identical distances from the explosion epicenters were so different in these two cities. American specialists were well informed about this, but they preferred to remain silent.

* This is the name given to victims of nuclear bombs.

The details of the unprecedented "field" tests of atomic weapons became known later on. To test the destructive action of the new weapons, atomic bombs of different design were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki--in particular, there were differences in the yield of neutron radiation. The plutonium bomb "Fatso" (Nagasaki) utilized the principle of implosion (an explosion directed inward) to elevate fissionable matter into supercritical state (ready for a nuclear chain reaction). For this purpose the nuclear fuel was surrounded by a thick layer of several hundred kilograms of chemical explosive that would form a large quantity of gaseous products (hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, carbon) upon explosion, the nuclei of which would interact actively with neutrons. As a result of trapping of the neutrons, their ejection into space was decreased significantly. In the atomic bomb "Tiny" which destroyed Hiroshima, a so-called cannon uranium charge was used. In this case the supercritical state was achieved owing to the joining of two portions of uranium. The neutrons released in this case by the nuclear reactions spread almost unhindered in surrounding space.

This is why mortality due to radiation sickness was noted to be significantly greater in Hiroshima than in Nagasaki, even when people were located similar distances from the explosion epicenter. It was as early as then that military specialists of the USA turned their attention to the extremely high destructive capability of neutrons.

Research conducted in recent years by physicians, biologists and physiologists revealed the mechanism behind interaction of neutrons with atoms and molecules of living tissues, and it confirmed that fast neutrons are significantly superior in biological effectiveness to other forms of radiation accompanying a nuclear explosion. The last act of the neutron tragedy is played out in cells of the human body. Following an explosion, neutral nuclear particles move at a velocity of several tens of thousands of kilometers per second. Entering living cells literally as projectiles, they knock nuclei out of atoms, tear molecular bonds, form free radicals highly capable of chemical reactions, and disturb the basic cycles of vital processes. According to the authoritative opinion of scientists of the M. Planck Institute in Munich, the action of neutrons upon molecules in living tissues may be compared "with billions of injections of a highly toxic acid having a lethal effect upon the human body."

In parallel with developing the neutron bomb, in the 1960s-1970s the USA conducted numerous experiments to study the destructive action of neutron radiation upon living organisms. Such research was carried out over a period of many years at the request of the Defense Department in a radiation biology laboratory in the city of San Antonio (Texas). Experiments were conducted on rhesus monkeys, the internal organs of which are the most similar to human organs. The monkeys were subjected to irradiation by fast neutrons--doses of several tens to several thousands of rads. (A rad is a unit of absorbed radiation dosage. When an X-ray is taken of the chest, irradiated tissue receive a dose of less than 1 rad.) Monkeys died in severe agony, allowing the experimenters to see how "pleasant" death by this "humane weapon" is. When the world public learned of such experiments, another wave of protests arose. The government of Malaysia, which sold thousands of rhesus monkeys to the USA each year, declared that their sale would continue only after

receiving an official guarantee from Washington that the animals would be used "exclusively for humanitarian purposes."

One of the insidious features of the action of ionizing radiation is that people in shelters or beyond the zone of severe radiation injury at the moment of explosion of neutron warheads may be subjected to irradiation by small doses. They may feel healthy for several months and even years, but a Damoclean sword would hang suspended over many of them all of this time. Biomedical research in the postwar decades persuaded scientists as to the subthreshold action of ionizing radiation--that is, as to the possible severe consequences of even small doses of radiation received by people.

According to the American press, among the 3,244 servicemen who participated in nuclear weapons testing under the code name "Smoky" in 1957 and received a radiation dose on the order of 10 rad, there were many cases of leukemia and various forms of cancer later on. A survey of residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki also showed that leukemia is the most widespread consequence of irradiation by small doses. The maximum number of such patients was revealed in 1950-1952--that is, 5-7 years after the explosions. Even 2 decades later, about 2,500 persons died each year in Japan from the consequences of the atomic bombs.

Disturbance of the genetic apparatus of the hereditary mechanism presents a no lesser danger to mankind. Speaking at a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet in October 1977, USSR Academy of Sciences president, Academician A. P. Aleksandrov said: "This weapon does more than kill. For each person killed, there will be 10 times more people receiving different doses of radiation. Some of them will die after various time intervals, while others, remaining alive, will give birth to monstrous progeny due to damage to genetic and hereditary structures. This is a mass destruction weapon directed at our progeny, a weapon which provokes unlimited thermonuclear war and which would be the worst misfortune to mankind...."

Damage to chromosomes and genes contained in sex cells leads to changes that may be transmitted by inheritance. In these cases progeny acquires a number of negative characteristics: usually reduced resistance to diseases, infertility and reduction of life span. According to a conclusion by Indian scientists an average of about 40 generations would be required for the harmful gene arising following mutations to cease its existence.

Numerous cases of hereditary injury by nuclear radiation suffered during the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be found in the special literature. Here is just one such human tragedy. Sumiko Mino, a ten-year-old Japanese girl, was lucky on the day of the atomic explosion: She was working in a field several kilometers from Nagasaki, and she was uninjured. Unaware of the danger, in the next 2 days she searched among the city's ruins for her deceased brother, and she received a certain dose of radiation. The mild illness Sumiko felt in the first while soon passed, and she began to feel healthy. After her marriage in 1958 she gave birth to a son Keniti, and a year later to a girl who died of leukemia at age twelve. The first signs of illness appeared in Keniti when he was 16 years old. After progressive worsening of his health, the young man was placed in a hospital, where

Japanese physicians discovered that he was suffering the same disease that led his sister to the grave. Soon after, the young man began vomiting and hemorrhaging, his temperature rose, and his vision began to weaken. The physicians did everything they could, and it appeared that the illness abated. A few months later Keniti was released from the hospital, and he even began going to school. But in summer 1975 his illness worsened dramatically, and on 6 August, exactly 30 years after the Hiroshima tragedy, Keniti died at age 17 from inherited radiation sickness. Thus atomic death reached out through a generation to its victims.

Use of low-power nuclear warheads, especially neutron warheads, creates one other new problem which mankind had not encountered in previous wars. I am referring to the possible significant numbers of servicemen and peaceful residents who will receive radiation doses of hundreds of rads, but who will continue to function for a certain amount of time before inevitable death. The unpredictability of the behavior and the social danger of this category of people, referred to as the walking dead by foreign specialists, must also be heeded when assessing the consequences of using neutron weapons.

American military specialists do not conceal the fact that in the first hours following a nuclear weapon strike, the social structure would break down, there would be massive degradation of the personality, social life would be destabilized, and a most savage struggle for existence would begin. It is no accident that American companies preparing standard equipment for personal shelters include firearms for protection of shelter occupants against attack by their surviving compatriots.

Had Hitler, who required of his henchmen that they "raise the technique of depopulating territory to perfection," acquired possession of such a "humane" weapon, he would have been totally satisfied. Professor E. Burop, mentioned earlier, angrily unmasked the supposed "humanitarianism" of neutron weapons. Recalling in this connection the leaders of Hitler's Third Reich, he wrote: "They (neutron weapons.--V. B.) would have been an ideal resource for their final resolution of not only the Jewish problem but also the Russian, Polish and Czech problems, and who knows, perhaps even the French and British problems. One can imagine the fabulous prospects they may have opened up for them, because all of the wealth of Europe would then have been left undamaged by the Nazis, and could have been used to establish their new order in Europe, untroubled by the presence of a local population."

6

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the American military-political leadership made an abrupt turn in its foreign policy; chiefly it altered its relationship toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Using various political and economic levers, the USA tried to change the foreign policy course of its NATO allies as well (not without success in a number of cases). In the transition to open confrontation with the Soviet Union, the tone was set by the bosses of the military-industrial complex and the Pentagon's "brass." The strategies of "mass retaliation" and "flexible response," which had gone bankrupt in their time, were brought back up to the light of day, slightly

refurbished and given a more up-to-date appearance. This plastic surgery led to the birth of the doctrine of "direct confrontation," which differs from its predecessors in being the most openly aggressive, in resting on superiority in force, and in having an openly anti-Soviet orientation.

Reagan tried to "enrich" the basic conceptions of the new strategy with the most aggressive premises that had ever been conceived in U.S. military doctrines prior to his. Leaving unchanged the premise of vertical escalation (in forms of weapons), he extended this concept to escalation of war in new geographical regions--horizontal escalation. Vertical and horizontal escalation have now become the favorite topics of discussion by Pentagon strategists. Much attention began to be devoted to preparing the armed forces and the entire country for a lengthy, protracted war using both conventional and nuclear arms.

In a public statement given in June 1982 at the British Parliament, Reagan officially declared the inception of another "crusade" against world communism. In a speech on the British Isles he announced his resolve to turn back the progress of world history: "That about which I speak today is a plan and a long-term hope, it is a march toward liberty and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism in the ash-heap of history." In this case Reagan did not conceal the fact that the "march toward liberty and democracy" was to proceed with the accompaniment of the launching of MX missiles, Trident missile submarines and B-1 and Stealth bombers, and the thunder of cruise missiles and neutron warheads.

Adopting its provocative "dual solution" (continued arms stockpiling plus negotiations) to conceal its dark designs, the American leadership went to the Geneva talks only in order to conceal its true goals and pacify world public opinion. Breaking off these negotiations, the leaders of the USA confirmed that their true goal was to deploy "Euromissiles," creating an entirely new situation in the correlation of nuclear forces. The sharp decrease in flying time (from 25-30 to 6-8 minutes) opens up extremely enticing prospects for the aggressor--he now has the possibility for preventive "counterforce" strikes against the most important targets on Soviet territory. This was recognized quite well not only in our country but also in the West, where many prominent politicians and public officials cautioned against the dangerous consequences of deploying American missiles in Europe.

John (Bernal), a prominent English physicist and public official, said the following back in the late 1950s without concealing his deep anxiety for the future of his country: "The real role of England in a future war will be to provide bases for American missile launch pads.... In the end, the policy of creating bases for missile launch pads could have but one of two possible outcomes: either it will be a senseless casting of money and effort to the winds, or it will provoke war and lead to annihilation of the English people."

In 1961 H. Schmidt, the future chancellor of the FRG (and subsequently one of the initiators and active proponents of deployment of "Euromissiles") reasoned quite realistically: "Every objectively thinking person is obliged to agree that deployment of hostile medium-range missiles at, so to speak, the threshold of a stranger's house would be perceived psychologically by a Big Power as a provocation.... American medium-range missiles are suited exclusively to a sudden or anticipatory strike, and not a retaliatory one."

What "limited nuclear" strategy means, in the minds of its authors and inspirers, is that deployment of American missiles in West Europe should avert the threat of war from the territory of the United States itself. Weighty arguments in favor of such designs are based on the results of numerous "studies" conducted in the USA. Different "think tanks" in the United States have modeled possible variants of exchanges of nuclear strikes between the USA and USSR on several occasions, and they invariably concluded that both superpowers would practically cease to exist as a result of nuclear war. This is why American strategists reiterate without end that the greater the probability of war in Europe, the greater are the chances that the USA would be left untouched by the big war. Stubbornly encouraging countries of West Europe to prepare for war with the Soviet Union, Washington is continuing to pursue its traditional policy--warring with foreign hands in behalf of its own interests. Long ago this practice acquired an official name in military-political circles of the USA--"war by contract," and, more frankly, "war by foreign blood."

Former U.S. Secretary of State H. Haig once confessed that the Americans prefer to fight the Russians basically with the hands of Europeans, providing (or more accurately, selling) American weapons to them: "Were we to begin a war tomorrow, contingents from European NATO countries would provide the commander of the NATO armed forces with 90 percent of all ground forces, 80 percent of all naval forces and about 75 percent of all air forces."

Intent on playing out the European variant of its "crusade," the USA deployed a powerful grouping of general-purpose forces in Europe totaling over 350,000 persons, outfitted with the most sophisticated weapons and combat equipment. This powerful fist allows the Washington administration to keep the governments of West European allies subservient, and the keys to war in its pocket.

The desire of the military-political leadership of the USA to play out the future war on European territory is also explained by the fact that this will make it possible for large American monopolies to eliminate competitors in the world capitalist market by this means. After all, in recent years Western Europe surpassed the United States in gross national product, level of industrial production and export volume. This naturally weakens the economic and political positions of American oligarchical financial groups and reduces their competitiveness and, consequently, their income, which they find difficult to reconcile to. And the influence of the owners of American industrial and bank capital upon the attitudes of the war machine is very great. Admiral A. Sanginetti, former commander-in-chief of the French Mediterranean fleet, described how shocked he was by the open cynicism of some American higher officers, who declared to the admiral without any embarrassment: "At some point we, the Americans, will have to think about the destruction of Europe. You in Europe, after all, are our most dangerous competitor...."

The experience of the past two wars, which were played out on the European continent, generated the optimism that in a future war, American monopolies would be able to utilize all the advantages of a "laughing third."

Following adoption of plans for "limited nuclear" war, the gazes of Pentagon strategists turned in the direction of neutron weapons. Their quantity was increased, and the quality of carriers for this weapon was improved. In the period from 1960 to 1983 the quantity of atomic artillery guns increased in the U.S. ground troops from 280 to 4,000 units. Atomic artillery was subjected to significant modernization: Its range of fire was increased significantly (from 15 to 30 kilometers), and all 155 and 203.2 mm guns now have nuclear projectiles in their ammunition rations. By 1990 the quantity of atomic artillery guns is to be increased by another time and a half. The NATO armies are also armed with 203.2 and 155-mm howitzers, which may fire nuclear and neutron projectiles "if necessary."

Deployment of the Lance missile system--one of the main carriers of neutron warheads--was started on the territory of West European countries in 1974. By 1977 the American army in Europe possessed six missile battalions with an official strength of 109 missiles. Today these missiles are present in the ground troops of England, the FRG, Italy and Israel. To satisfy the demands of the American army and its allies, each year the USA produces about 400 such missiles.

Military theorists of the USA and the NATO countries cite "persuasive proof" that only with neutron warheads can a "mass offensive by armored forces of the Warsaw Pact countries" be halted. Proclaiming the feasibility of using neutron weapons in a future war, they are calculating the possible economic gains from such a war. In application to combat activities, the customary "money-goods" formula of capitalist relationships has transformed into the principal indicator of military financial operations--"cost-benefit." After all, American ruling circles have always considered war to be big business. Military theorists calculated that in order to achieve the effect of annihilating tank crews resulting from the explosion of one neutron warhead, nonnuclear resources would have to "transform an area of 100 hectares into a lunar landscape of the like witnessed at Verdun." American strategists are also attempting to persuade their allies that were neutron weapons to be used, the war would be fought only between troops of the warring countries. In their opinion, use of "highly toxic weapons with a limited effective radius" to destroy manpower, tank crews, combat crews and command posts "would make it possible to resort to tactics typical of a counterforce struggle."

In the September 1977 issue of the journal ARMY, P. Rodgers, an American military specialist, paints the picture of combat activities employing neutron warheads in an openly anti-Soviet spirit: "The second day of war. Withdrawing in combat, the U.S. 14th Mechanized Division inflicts heavy losses upon the enemy. But each of the tank battalions of the 14th division have 7-8 tanks left, and the losses in the infantry companies exceed 30 percent. According to air intelligence two Russian tank and two motorized infantry divisions are occupying forming-up places for an attack 15 kilometers from the front line. A little time passes, and hundreds of armored vehicles advance along an 8-kilometer front, disposed in depth. The intensity of the enemy's artillery and air strikes grows, and the entire forward edge of defense is engulfed in smoke and explosions of shells and bombs. A critical situation evolves.... A coded message is delivered to the division headquarters. Permission was

given to the army commander to use neutron weapons. NATO aviation is ordered to leave the zone of combat operations. Gun commanders report their preparedness to open fire. Fire! Nuclear bursts appear 100-150 meters above the combat formations of the attacking enemy at dozens of the most important points. But in the first moments their effect upon the enemy seems insignificant. A relatively small quantity of vehicles within a hundred yards of the explosion epicenters are annihilated. But the battlefield is nonetheless riddled by flows of invisible lethal radiation. The enemy attack continues, but in a few minutes it loses its purposefulness. Tanks and armored personnel carriers move in disorder, they run into one another, they turn in place, and they maintain disordered fire. Low-flying enemy airplanes turn over in flight and crash. Within a short time the enemy loses up to 30,000 men. Initiating fire strikes, the 14th division goes over to a decisive offensive...."

Such anti-Soviet gibberish on the pages of American and West European press is published daily, and in enormous quantities. These discourses proclaim "NATO's peacefulness," "Russian aggressiveness" and, of course, "the defensive nature and high effectiveness of neutron weapons."

In fact, however, according to estimates by prominent politicians and military officials, neutron warheads are more an offensive than a defensive resource. Striking enemy defenses and annihilating enemy manpower, tank crews and command post crews, after a certain while the aggressor can penetrate unhindered and seize foreign territory together with all of the arms and material valuables it contains. Replying to the fantasies of proponents of the new weapon concerning its defensive nature, (E. Bar), a deputy in the West German Bundestag, said the following in an interview by the weekly DIE ZEIT: "An aggressor who aspires to clean, if we may be permitted to use that expression, defenders off of territory which he wishes to conquer, and to acquire production enterprises as whole and well preserved as possible, should be interested in using neutron weapons."

An authoritative opinion was stated in this regard by the Italian General (N. Pasti), former deputy commander-in-chief of NATO forces in Europe: "It would be wrong to assert that a neutron bomb is a defensive weapon; its characteristics testify that it is chiefly an offensive weapon intended for penetration of enemy defenses without causing destruction and contamination that would hinder the aggressor's forward movement." Former chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (G. Vishnevski) turned public attention to the absurdity of President Reagan's statement that this weapon would supposedly be stockpiled on U.S. territory, and that it would be intended for annihilation of "attacking Russian tanks." The possibility of such use of nuclear warheads, Vishnevski said, would appear only in the event that "the Russians sneak up to the U.S. coast in submarine tanks."

The defenders of neutron weapons argue in vain that their use would supposedly raise the nuclear threshold and thus protect the world from nuclear apocalypse. But there is no way that we can agree with this.

A TASS statement published 14 August 1981 had this to say in this regard: "Appearance of neutron weapons in military arsenals would result in a dangerous

reduction of the so-called nuclear threshold and, in simple language, an increase in the risk of nuclear war, and the entire responsibility for this would rest upon the United States of America." Even many American military theorists exhibit weak faith in the mythical possibility of limiting the dimensions of a nuclear conflict.

The most farsighted politicians and military officials of West European countries also point out that the neutron bomb is the match which will light the fire of a big war. General Francisco da Costa Gomes, Portugal's former president is convinced that "the decision to produce neutron weapons, even if it were to be considered from purely military positions, is in no way justified.... Production and possible use of neutron weapons would immediately cause an increase in the probability of universal thermonuclear war."

The very possibility that American generals might use tactical nuclear weapons on their territory, and without their consent, has evoked serious concern among certain political leaders of a number of West European countries. And although they prefer to hide their eyes to the danger of such an unequal North Atlantic partnership, it is becoming increasingly more difficult for them to counter the arguments of the opposition and of peace-loving forces which fear, not without grounds, that the USA and Europe might press the button that will make the cradle of world civilization fall victim to the thrasher of war. In the opinion of some foreign higher officers one of the "advantages" of the new weapon is the possibility of putting it to use without preliminary permission from the higher command, if the fundamental consent of the political leadership of the USA is obtained beforehand. Responding to a question from an American senator concerning the number of tactical nuclear resources that could be used without the consent of the governments of the NATO countries, General (E. Gudpeyster), former troop commander-in-chief for this bloc in Europe, admitted: "All 7,000 warheads...."

7

In recent years the top leadership of the USA has devoted considerable attention to creating mobile formations--so-called rapid deployment forces (RDF)--to support its expansionist policy. The mobile strike group is intended for armed operations in the most diverse regions of the world, especially where, in the opinion of the country's military-political elite, permanent American military bases are unfeasible.

A special command--CENTCOM, the sphere of action of which includes, by a decision from Washington, 19 states contiguous with the Indian Ocean basin--was created in January 1983. The rapid deployment forces, which contain over 200,000 regular army soldiers and about 100,000 reservists, were subordinated to this command. They are organized into three divisions, a few separate brigades and special-purpose units. In the next few years the composition of this strike grouping will be approximately doubled. The RDF are armed with the most sophisticated tanks, armored personnel carriers, missiles, helicopters and atomic artillery guns capable of firing neutron projectiles. The combat activities of these forces are to be supported by over 700 tactical aircraft, strategic bombers, AWACS early-warning airplanes, 3 carrier task forces and 2 expeditionary marine divisions.

Defense Secretary C. Weinberger let it slip, apparently not by accident, at a press conference on 11 August 1981 that neutron weapons "may be used on battlefields outside of Europe." This was not just another propaganda trick of Washington, inasmuch as the reality of these plans is persuasively evidenced by the Pentagon's intentions to deploy neutron weapons on the island of Diego Garcia, which the American war machine is transforming into its largest military base in the Indian Ocean. Circles close to official Washington do not conceal the fact that use of neutron weapons as a means of repelling an attack by enemy armored forces on oil deposits of Iran or Saudi Arabia is planned. In an interview with the Egyptian newspaper (AL'-AKHBAR), Pentagon chief C. Weinberger declared quite openly: "The main objective of American rapid deployment forces is to protect oil deposits and defend American interests and interests of the USA's friends at any point on the planet."

According to information leaked to the foreign press, American strategists have developed detailed plans for occupying oil fields in the Persian Gulf zone with rapid deployment forces. Examining the possibility of using the new tactical weapons in such operations, the French newspaper L'HUMANITE emphasizes: A neutron bomb is "an ideal weapon of war strategy on foreign territory." Preparations for its use by rapid deployment forces, which are clearly not intended for defensive objectives, are precisely what reveal its offensive, aggressive nature.

The Pentagon's plans raised considerable alarm among state and public officials of a large number of developing countries situated in the "arc of instability." During his visit to the USSR, Madagascar's President D. Ratsiraka anxiously noted that "the neutron bomb is the most terrifying weapon for annihilating people, and developing countries are among its most possible victims." The Indian newspaper PATRIOT, concerned by Weinberger's statements in relation to the possible use of a neutron bomb, wrote: "In precisely the same way that it used Hiroshima and Nagasaki earlier to test the atomic bomb, and then Vietnam to test other barbarian forms of mass destruction weapons, the military-industrial complex, which is the real ruler of America, wants to use African and Asian countries as experimental rabbits to reveal the effectiveness of the neutron bomb."

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Prominent military specialists are convinced that adoption of neutron warheads would be the start of a new stage in the arms race. This stage would be characterized by appearance of fundamentally new, even more cunning and sophisticated resources of mass annihilation. Numerous press reports confirm that the United States has already recently been working on the development of the most fantastic projects embracing almost the entire range of electromagnetic radiation and referred to by the general term "death rays." The ideas of certain Nazi "scientists" were used for this purpose in the initial variants. During World War II for example, the German roentgenologist (Shiboldt), who, through his delirious ideas, gained the favor of one of the leaders of German aviation, Field Marshal Milch, developed a plan for using a powerful betatron (an electron accelerator) to create a high-voltage roentgen device. He hoped to use it to annihilate the pilots of enemy airplanes.

A significant place has recently been given in the aggressive plans of Washington to the "star wars" conception, which President Reagan has light-handedly covered with the "strategic defense initiative" fig leaf. In the opinion of American military specialists, space is precisely what may create decisive military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union for the United States. Striving to mislead the world public, the American administration declares that it is supposedly talking in this case only about conducting research in the interests of defense. In fact, however, this is a typical tactic which has already been tested successfully before--revealing the true nature of complex issues in parts. The true goals of the work were revealed in a speech given by the American president in March 1983: creation of a weapon to annihilate targets in space and targets on enemy territory from space. Research on a "multilayered" antimissile defense system is the first necessary stage in the work, which will inevitably be followed by testing, production and deployment of the new weapon. The seriousness of these plans can be seen in the allocation of \$26 billion for the research. If we consider that the entire program is estimated at an astronomical sum of \$500 billion, one can understand the enthusiasm of the bosses of the military-industrial complex and their proteges in Congress.

Combat resources characterized by a very wide range of activity are proposed as weapons in this space system. The Pentagon's "think tanks" are developing new ray weapon systems utilizing nuclear minicharges. High-power gas-dynamic and roentgen lasers capable of being aimed with high precision should, in the minds of their creators, insure dependable destruction of the enemy's missiles and space vehicles. Great hopes are being laid on beam weapons, the action of which is based on utilizing high-energy particles or high-directional microwave radiation. These projects are being conducted under the "Chair Heritage" and "White Horse" programs. Neutron weapons can be utilized for this purpose as well, especially if they are designed for directed action. Nuclear particles and electromagnetic radiation spread enormous distances unhindered in space, and therefore the destructive action of such weapons can surpass the boldest expectations. Intensive research aimed at creating an electromagnetic cannon that could be deployed in space is being conducted under the code name "Jedi." The enormous velocity of its projectiles should insure high target destruction reliability.

An ASAT antisatellite missile system is being developed on the basis of the F-15 fighter.

The broadness of the circle of the "scientific" interests of American military specialists may be judged at least from the fact that the USA is conducting fundamental research in particle and antiparticle annihilation, antigravity and various energy fields, all for the sake of creating weapons based on completely new physical principles.

Washington's plans are especially dangerous in that creation of an antimissile system containing space-based elements destabilizes the strategic balance between the two big powers. The notion that they may strike with impunity and that they could even weaken the aggressor's retaliatory strike would encourage the most militant circles of the USA to make a preventive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.

In the last decade the struggle for cessation of the arms race, for disarmament and for preservation of peace transformed into a cause of millions of people. Report of President Reagan's plan to produce "death rays" evoked a new wave in this movement. In response to an appeal from the World Peace Council and its national committees, demonstrations of thousands, protest marches, meetings and rallies were held in Canada, Japan, India, Australia, Holland, France and other countries. Never before had the capital of the FRG witnessed an antiwar demonstration of such proportions as that held in Bonn on 10 October 1981, and in which, according to the calculations of its organizers, about 300,000 persons took part. The most grandiose antiwar demonstration of England's history, conducted in London on 24 October 1981, brought together 250,000 proponents of peace. The population of the "USA's unsinkable aircraft carrier" recently intensified the struggle for nuclear disarmament and against deployment of American "Euromissiles" in the territories of their countries. Numerous demonstrations, meetings and protests against the aggressive plans of the militarists have also been held at the White House. The Communist Party of the USA is marching in the front ranks of the American champions of peace. Communists are courageously proclaiming the truth about the real culprits of international tension, about those who are stubbornly prodding the world toward the brink of World War III.

Public opinion surveys conducted recently in the USA showed that 96 percent of the Americans feel that the United States and the Soviet Union must not resolve their conflicts by military means. In this case 92 percent of those surveyed are convinced that the USA is not in a position to attain military superiority over the USSR, and that therefore the arms race is useless.

All of this confirms the profound validity of the words of CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, who said that the idea of disarmament, now that it has captured the minds of the masses, is playing an increasingly greater role as a material force in world policy.

The Soviet Union has invariably marched in the vanguard of the struggle of the peoples of the world against the nuclear threat, and decisively demanded an end to the arms race, prohibition of nuclear weapons forever and annihilation of their stockpiles.

On receiving the first reports about the efforts being conducted in the USA to create a "clean" nuclear weapon, on 31 August 1961, the Soviet government published a statement. In it, the peoples of the world were informed that "today the USA is busy with projects for creating a neutron bomb--a bomb which would kill all that lives but which would not destroy material valuables." The Soviet leadership proposed the creation of such a new weapon should be abandoned.

When in the late 1970s the neutron bomb question was raised in the USA to the stage of practical implementation, statements by Soviet leaders once again clearly supported the point of view of the USSR: "The Soviet Union is decisively opposed to creation of the neutron bomb.... But were this bomb to be

created in the West..., we would be forced to reply to this challenge for the purposes of insuring the security of the Soviet people, their allies and their friends. We do not want this, and therefore we propose reaching an agreement on mutual abandonment of production of a neutron bomb, in order to spare the world from appearance of this new weapon of mass annihilation."

In order that practical measures could be adopted to bridle the nuclear arms race, together with fraternal socialist countries the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention on prohibition of the production, accumulation and deployment of neutron weapons to the Disarmament Committee in March 1978. Adoption of this convention would place a barrier in the way of military use of "death rays," reduce tensions in the world's military-political situation, and represent an important practical step forward to establishing an atmosphere of mutual trust. This peace initiative was given a high assessment by the progressive world public and by all people of good will. But during discussion of the draft in the Disarmament Committee the USA and its NATO allies simply blocked this proposal and foiled signing of the convention. After President Reagan adopted the decision to produce and stockpile neutron warheads, TASS published a statement decisively condemning this step by the American leadership. The statement pointed out directly that "neutron weapons are not at all being created for deployment on U.S. territory, and that any day, they may wind up on the European continent or in some other region which the White House might find reason to declare a 'sphere of vital interests of the USA'. As a result, that which is referred to today as an 'internal business' of the USA will carry a price tag of millions dead on other continents, and it will become the start of a world nuclear fire, the flames of which will engulf the United States as well." However, none of this reduced the resolve of the American administration to acquire an advantage in weapons on the battlefield at all costs.

Soviet-American negotiations on limiting nuclear and space weapons offer a real possibility for reducing the threat of world nuclear catastrophe. On many occasions the Soviet Union has confirmed its readiness to honorably travel its share of the path in this direction. Our position in issues of disarmament and reinforcement of international security is invariable and consistent. This is why it enjoys the enormous trust and support of the Soviet people, and of all progressive society.

In a speech given 11 March of this year, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev declared: "...we want to halt and not continue the arms race, and this is why we propose freezing nuclear arsenals and halting further missile deployment; we want a real and major reduction of stockpiled arms, and not creation of more and more new weapon systems, be they in space or on earth."

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